

**S T A T E**  
**OF THE**  
**British and French Colonies**  
**I N**  
**N O R T H A M E R I C A,**

With Respect to  
Number of **PEOPLE, FORCES, FORTS,**  
**INDIANS, TRADE** and other Advantages.

In which are considered,

- I. The defenceless Condition of our Plantations,  
and to what Causes owing.
- II. Pernicious Tendency of the *French* Encroachments,  
and the fittest Methods of frustrating them.
- III. What it was occasioned their present Invasion,  
and the Claims on which they ground their Proceedings.

WITH A  
Proper **EXPEDIENT** proposed for  
preventing future Disputes.

In **TWO LETTERS** to a **FRIEND.**

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# ST. A. T. B.

OF THE

British and French Colonies

TO THE AMERICAN

WE HAVE

Added a Chapter on the  
Trade and the Advantages

of the Colonies

to the Colonies of our  
American Colonies

to the Colonies of our  
American Colonies

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I N

N O R T H A M E R I C A .

S I R,

**T**HE *French* having, since their forcible entry into *Nova Scotia*, greatly augmented the cause of our complaints, instead of removing them, by seizing the western part of *Virginia*, a much larger and no less valuable country; you desire to have my sentiments on their designs by their present encroachments, and on the means of frustrating them, as well as preventing the like for the future: you likewise expect from me an account of the state both of the *English* and *French* Colonies, with respect to their extent, number of people, forces, forts, *Indians* and trade. This is a difficult, and perhaps an invidious task; fitter to be undertaken by one who, having been long resident in north *America*, is thoroughly acquainted with the several nations of *Indians* and the countries which they inhabit, as well as with the affairs of the *British* colonies. However, as you desire it, for reasons of a national consideration, I shall endeavour to oblige

B

you

you to the best of my power : on which occasion I shall premise, that the present unhappy situation of our *American* colonies, is owing to a series of bad management, as well on this as on the other side of the ocean : and altho' I shall touch them as gently as possible, yet as a remedy cannot be properly applied without knowing the cause and circumstances of the disease, I promise you not to disguise or wilfully misrepresent matters, but give them impartially just as I find them, on good authority, under certain heads.

## I.

*Importance of the Ohio country, and views of the French in their present proceedings.*

THE patience with which the *French* were so long suffered to settle and fortify themselves in *Nova Scotia*, without doubt emboldened them to enter and drive us out of the country of the *Ohio* : but heavens be thanked, this second audacious step has opened the eyes of the whole nation, and made some people think of *American* affairs more than ever they intended, altho' others remain deeply regardless and insensible as ever, and perhaps would continue so till the nation was no more, were they to live long enough to perish with it. But their insensibility does not make the extreme danger which now threatens our *American* colonies one jot the less ; and which in threatening them threatens their mother country, since, in whatever fate betides them, she must herself inevitably be involved.

Altho' the *French* are vastly increased in north *America* since the peace of *Utrecht*, and have by far the superiority of the *English* as to numbers

in



in the islands, yet in the *Continent* they are still much inferior to the *English*. Nor is it for want of being sensible of this disparity that they have dared to attack us, tho' so much inferior in number. They know this defect on their own side perfectly well, but depend for their success upon what they know to be more advantageous than a superiority in numbers, and that is, the division which reigns among the colonies, their defenceless state, and slowness in action; as they did not scruple to declare to Major *Washington*, when he went to their forts on the lakes.

Of what great importance the country of the *Ohio* is to our *English* colonies will appear, from considering the vast conveniencies which, by its situation only, (independent of its other advantages mentioned hereafter) it would afford the *French* of securing and improving their own colonies, as well as annoying ours.

This country lying in the middle space between their settlements in *Canada* and *Louisiana* (to which last they pretend it belongs) and at the back also of our middle colonies, would give them an opportunity not only of joining their two very distant plantations, whenever they should be in a condition to do it, but also of preventing us from extending our settlements backward beyond the great mountains towards the *Mississippi*, and of attacking them on that side. It would farther strengthen them and weaken us, by putting it in their power to gain the *Indians* of that large country over to their interest, some of whom, as the *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis*, now in friendship with the *English*, are very numerous and warlike. This would be a very large addition to their strength, and enable them to give great disturbance to the *Indians* in alliance with the *English*.

as well in the northern as the southern colonies : while, by their intermediate situation, they will prevent their assisting each other beyond the great mountains, by cutting off all communication between them.

Their having possession of this country would be of still more pernicious consequence to us ; as by the conveniency of the *Ohio* and its branches, they would have it in their power at any time to attack, to great advantage, either our northern or southern provinces. By means of the *Ohio* they might come with their *Indians* into the country of the five nations, and also the provinces of *New York* and *Pensylvania* : while the river of the *Charokees*, one of its branches, which falls into it near its mouth in the *Mississippi*, would give them an easy passage into the country of those *Indians*, and both *Carolinas*, which would lie open to their attacks. In reality, were they strong enough, they might at present invade us on that side by this last river, having secured admission into it by the forts which they have erected at the mouths of the *Ohio* and the *Wabash*.

From what has been said it seems but too evident, that if the *French* had this country, they would in time be masters of all the *British* colonies. This province is as necessary a barrier against them in the middle parts of our settlements, as those of *Nova Scotia* and *Georgia* are on the north and south ; and since their design is so apparently to hem us in, and contract our bounds as much as possible, it stands us upon to keep them at as great a distance as we can. The *French* are very sensible, that in case we should once become masters of this important country, by settling and fortifying it, that they could never hope to unite their two colonies, at least on this

this side of the *Mississippi*: one of the grand points which they have had in view ever since they entered that river and settled at *New Orleans* in 1699; and this makes them so very earnest to get the *Ohio* country out of our hands, which, for that reason, was it all a rock or sandy desert, we ought by no means to permit.

From their manner of proceeding, in forcibly wresting from the *British* dominions in *America*, two such considerable provinces, and building forts all along our frontiers; it looks as if their intention was not only to cut off our inland trade with the *Indian* nations, but also to attack our Colonies on all sides, when once they have effectually surrounded them with a chain of fortifications, if not before: and I fancy, from what I am going to offer in support of this opinion, that you will be inclined to think there is nothing at all chimerical in it.

Altho' *Lewis XIV.* had in the year 1686, entered into a treaty of neutrality with *England* for *North America*, yet in 1688 he embarked in a project, which, in violation of the said treaty, his subjects had formed to subdue the *British* Colonies in that part of the Continent, and to begin with the conquest of *New York*.

The chevalier *de Callieres*, who had contrived the scheme, posted into *France* to propose it, and solicit assistance. The King approved of the plan, and the Count *de Frontenac*, sent over Governor to *Canada*, was charged with the command of the expedition. He was to march his troops by land to *New York*, while the *Sieur de Cassiniere* was to ply with his ships before the port, till the signal should be given for him to enter. Matters were so to be ordered, that both forces should appear before the place at the same

time; but thro' some mistakes in the execution, they were obliged to give over the design for that time; and a dreadful irruption of the five nations, which happened immediately after, would have effectually ruined *Canada*, in case they had been supported by the *English*.

But altho' their design miscarry'd that time, they did not lay it aside; and the late irruption of the five nations only spurred them on to execute it, in order to prevent another from the same quarter. However, they were frustrated a second time in their design: for while they were preparing in *Canada* to destroy the *English*, the latter were preparing to subdue *Canada*; so that they were obliged to keep their forces to defend themselves.

The next year a new plan was set on foot by Mr. *Denonville*, governor of *Canada*, who declared it as his opinion, " that the only way to  
 " terminate the war in *America* (for war was now  
 " proclaimed in *Europe*) was to take *Manhatté*,  
 " (so the *French* call *New York*) that it might  
 " be done with six frigates and 1200 land soldiers;  
 " that 3000 men, consisting of the troops  
 " and militia of the country, would easily make  
 " themselves masters of the fort *Orange* (or  
 " *Albany*): that after the capital was taken,  
 " it would be absolutely necessary to burn it,  
 " and ruin the country as far as *Orange*: that  
 " by means of this post, which it would be  
 " easy to keep, they should break off all communication  
 " between the *English* and *Iroquois*  
 " (or the five nations,) compel these latter to have  
 " recourse to the *French*, and hinder the *French*  
 " allies from making alliances prejudicial to the  
 " Colony of *Canada*: in fine, that fort *Orange*  
 " would serve to keep in awe all the coast of  
 " *New*



" *New England*, which tho' very well peopled,  
" was quite defenceless."

This was the well-concerted plan of the Marquis *Denonville*, which *Charlevoix*, who inserts the whole in his spurious history of *New France*, imagines could not have failed of success, in case it had been supported, and expresses great concern that it was not : but as forces could not be spared at that juncture for the expedition, they were obliged to drop the design once more.

The reasons which were alledged in the said plan, for the intended conquest, were,

1. To prevent the ravages of the five nations, by reducing their supporters.
2. To get the commerce of the *Indians* into their hands, of which the *English* deprived them.
3. For the benefit of *Canada*, which cannot be secure so long as the *English* are its neighbours.
4. Because the interest of the *English* and the *French* are utterly incompatible.

It was upon these principles that the *French* undertook, in time of peace, to conquer the *English* dominions in *America*; and believed these arguments would sufficiently justify their proceedings to all the world.

Now, as these reasons will always subsist, it is plain that they will never forgo their project. The things they complain of are to them insupportable evils; and therefore they will be sure to have recourse to the remedy whenever they think themselves in a condition to apply it: And considering their present proceedings, joined to the steps they have been taking for several years past preparatory thereto, would not any body believe



that they are actually about executing their long-concerted scheme? 'Tis true, one might be apt to doubt it, when he reflects on the number of people now inhabiting the *British* Colonies, and that one of them might be a match for *Canada*. This gives a handle to vain, ignorant, and disaffected persons to make slight of what has past, as if it was not worth the government's taking notice of : but, does not the great and sudden progress which the *French* have already made evince, what a handful of men may do against many hundred thousand, when disunited, and under no proper regulation?

'Tis true, they have not yet attacked *New York* : but, must not every body in the world, who is acquainted with this scheme, conclude, that fort *Frederic* at *Crown Point* (or rather *Scalp Point*) on the south end of *Champlain* lake, was built by them for this very design? It is only to be wished, that we may be in a condition to resist them before they attempt it : for they never had so favourable a juncture as this, when the excessive debts of the nation might be thought, in some measure, to disable us from resenting our wrongs, or affording our plantations the requisite assistance ; and the disunion which subsists among the Colonies renders them unable to help themselves ; at a time when we are told they are without forts, without arms, without ammunition, and without money !

Their settling at *New Orleans* about nine years after they had formed the scheme of conquering *New York*, put it into their heads to go a more slow, but surer way to work, by insensibly encroaching upon our Colonies, and surrounding them with forts. Before that time, tho' always

very

very troublesome, they seemed to confine themselves within moderate limits, and had only three forts, excepting those of *Quebek* and *Montreal*, in the neighbourhood of our northern Colonies; namely, those of *Chambly*, 20 miles south-east of *Montreal*, *Frontenac* on the north-east end of lake *Kadarakui* on *Ontario*, and *Denonville* on the south-west side of the same lake, near the falls of *Niagara*; which seemed to be built rather to defend their own frontiers than encroach on those of the *English*, and the last was almost as soon destroyed as built: but from the above-mentioned period, they began to entertain vaster designs. However, they were prevented by the war till after the peace of *Utrecht* in 1713, which is the æra from whence the growing state of *Canada* may be dated; and in proportion as the *French* took care to extend their territories, the *English* neglected, or rather seemed utterly to abandon the care of theirs: as if the great struggle at the treaty of *Utrecht*, in behalf of their *American* dominions, proceeded rather from the glory of having their title acknowledged by *France*, than any real value they had for, or design of preserving, them.

The *French* began their encroachments about 1715, by building fort *Toulouse* on the river *Alabama*, in or near the country of the *Creek Indians*, and the back of *Carolina*; a place which the *English* had been in possession of 28 years before. Their next attempt was to try the pulses of the ministry, with regard to *Nova Scotia*, by denying our title to it; which they had, in the most solemn manner and formal terms, given up but six years before. Finding them easy enough to consent to a negotiation, instead of resenting the insult, and the people of the Colonies wholly taken up

up with their own private interests and quarrels, they watched their opportunity; and in 1731, usurped from the province of *New York* all the lands for above 120 miles to the south of *St. Lawrence's* river, by building fort *Frederick* at *Crown Point*. In 1750 they seized two parts in three of *Nova Scots*, by building forts at *Sbeganekso* and *Baye Verte*; since when they have built two others at the mouth of *St. John's* river. In 1726, they encroached on *Pensylvania*, by erecting, or rather restoring a fort call'd *Demonville*, near the falls of *Niawgra* above-mentioned. Those forts and that of *de Troite* between the lakes *Erri* and *Hurons* were built, that by their means the *French* might command the *Straits*, on which they stand, and open or shut them just as they themselves should think fit.

Fort *de Troite* in 1712, the *Outegamis* promised to burn, and bring in the *English*; but they miscarried. "Had this place been lost, says *Charlevoix*,  
" and the *English* taken possession, it would quite  
" have ruined *New France*, as 'tis the center and  
" finest part of all *Canada*, and it would have  
" been impossible to have the least communication with the savages above, or with *Louisiana*."

This proves what I have observed as to the designed obstruction; and shews how many ways there were, and opportunities we have had of putting a stop to the progress of the *French*, and preventing them from uniting their two Colonies.

These forts, therefore, appear to have been built to limit our northern Colonies on the west, as *Toulouse* was, with design that it should be our *ne plus ultra* on the same side of *Carolina* and *Georgia*: lastly, they have built forts on *Lake Erri*, and driven us out of ours on the *Ohio* near *Logstown*, in order to let us know that they will not suffer us to possess an inch of ground to the west of the *Alligany* mountains.

By

By these limits, which the *French* have prescribed us by their forts, they have stript us of more than nine parts in ten of *North America*, which they may be said now to be in possession of; and left us only a skirt of coast along the *Atlantic* shore, bounded on the north by the river *St. Lawrence*, and on the west by the *Appalachian* or *Alligany* mountains, which are no where above 280 miles distant from the coast, and in some parts not more than 120.

In consequence of these proceedings they have already prevented us from extending our settlements beyond their present bounds; cut off all our intercourse with the *Indians*; and farther reduced the small share they had left us of the *Fur* trade, having gotten into their possession six or seven eighths of it before. But if left in possession of such great advantages, it is not to be imagined that our good neighbours will stop there: they who have unjustly usurped so much from us, would not long be content without seizing the whole, if it was in their power; and this most certainly they intended in a short time to attempt; nor could it have been in the power of the united force of our plantations to withstand them.

It was, doubtless, not without a view to this design, that in 1750, Mr. *Claubert*, a lieutenant in the King's fleet, was sent to survey the peninsula of *Nova Scotia*, from the gut of *Canso* quite round the coast as far as *Port Royal*, under colour of doing service to Geography and Navigation. It was certainly doing both a very important service; and that gentleman has executed his plan (the more meritoriously, as the voyage was undertaken at his own request) with an address which does him extraordinary honour; yet this is a work, which, at a time when the *French* had

had invaded our territories in that very part, the *English*, I think, ought not to have suffered.

Luckily for the Colonies, they have discovered their design before their chain of forts was completed, and they were sufficiently prepared for putting it in execution: for doubtless their intention was first to have deprived us of all *Indian* assistance, especially in the northern colonies, where they proposed to attack us, by either cutting off or subduing the six nations and their allies. This as a memorial before me, written by an *American* about that time, sets forth, they threatened to do in 1732, the year after they had built their fort at *Crown-point*: so much did the gaining that point embolden them, and so much had the colonies chiefly concerned reason to repent their having suffered so dangerous an incroachment. After subduing the six nations, their next motion probably would have been to build a fort or forts in the country of the *Cherokees*, as those *Indians* informed the Governor of *Carolina* they had often threatened: then perhaps they might have attempted to erect one at the head of the rivers *Kennebek* and *La Chaudiere*, in a place hereafter-mentioned. But, for fear of alarming the colonies too much, in all probability they would not have thought of seizing the *Ohio* in the borders of *Virginia*, till they found matters ripe for execution: for as their end in this was to leave the northern colonies no *Indians* to assist them, it seems to have been designed for their last step. That they took it so prematurely, was doubtless to prevent the *English*; who, they apprehended, or rather were informed, were making preparations for settling that country: for it appears now, that the intentions of the colonies on that head were betrayed to the *French*; and the secret of the *Ohio*



*Ohio* grant, to the *Indians*. It was this which brought the former sooner than they intended into those parts; and made the latter desert or turn against the *Virginians*, which occasioned their defeat in the battle of the great meadows.

As the *French* in 1688 set on foot their project during the peace, in expectation of a war soon breaking out, they are doubtless at present in a like expectation: it is likely too that their intent was, as they seem to have done, to begin the war in *America*; which according to some is the most proper place for them to begin it in.

That the *French* were not far off from putting their old scheme in execution, might be inferred from the conduct of their geographers; who of late have been more than ordinarily busy at curtailing the *British* territories in their maps; by which they lay claim to a great deal more than their countrymen have taken possession of. For they cut off from us near one half of *Hudson's* river, which belongs to *New York*, and the whole country of the five nations, tho' expressly yielded by the treaty of *Utrecht*. Altho' by the original grant of our Kings *Pensylvania* is extended five degrees, or about 260 miles west of *Delaware* river, yet they for the general retrench three of those degrees; and some make the *Susquebanna* its western boundary, contracting that province to the breadth of 70 miles, and depriving it of all the western branches of that great river. *Virginia* they limit by the *Appalachian* or *Alligany* mountains; and curtail 200 miles of it southward, making *Asheley* river its boundary, under pretence of their settlements in 1562: but the late Mr. *Del Isle* went still farther on a worse foundation; for in his map of *New France*, published 1718, he transfers the whole province over

to his own nation, by making it a part of *Louisiana*, under the false suggestion that the name of *Carolina* was given to it by the *French* in honour of their King *Charles*; and now at length, to make short work of it, one of their present geographers, Mr. *Robert*, has run away with all the *British* colonies at once, and carried them into *Canada*\*, doubtless under the lame pretence of *Verazzani's* discovery in 1524, tho' 27 years posterior to that of the *Cabots*.

Can any thing be more evident from all these instances, than that the *French* resolve never to give over their encroachments on our territories, but to gain upon them by degrees, till they have accomplished their long concerted design of swallowing up the whole. In that case, what a most formidable power would *France* arrive at! "For  
 " when become masters of all our *American* trade,  
 " our sugars, tobacco, rice, timber, and naval  
 " stores, they would soon, saith the above-men-  
 " tioned memorialist, be an over match in naval  
 " strength to the rest of *Europe*, and so in a  
 " condition to give laws to the whole."

## II.

### *State of the French and English colonies compared.*

**I**F a foreigner, unacquainted with the affairs of *America*, was to hear in what manner they have driven us, as it were, into a corner and blocked us up, he would conclude that the *French* are vastly more numerous there than the *English*; whereas the very reverse of this is the case. From an exact enquiry made on the spot last year, by

\* See the Conduct of the *French*, p 45.

a very capable person, it did not appear that the whole inhabitants or *French* of *Canada* exceeded 45,000 souls, of which 15,000 are fighting men. This tallies with the account given by Colonel *Livingston* in 1732, as to the last article, altho' he observed, that the *French* themselves made their number amount to 18,000. But we are assured from another hand, that in 1747, all their militia or sensible men, capable of marching, did not exceed 12,000 men, with about 1000 regular troops, and as many *Indians*, who may be prevailed on to march. As for *Louisiana*, the number of *French* throughout the whole province, which they thus extend from the *Mexikan* gulf to the *Illinois* river, in about latitude 40 degrees, the space of 800 leagues, is very small: but supposing it contains 6 or 7000, with auxiliary *Indians*, the province of either *New York* or of *Connecticut* in *New England* has more men in it than both their colonies together: so that, on a moderate calculation, the number of *French* in their two settlements, tho' greatly increased since the peace of *Utrecht*, holds a proportion to that of the *English* in theirs, which very little exceeds one to twenty. "But (as a memorial now before me observes on this occasion) union, situation, proper management of the *Indians*, superior knowledge of the country, and constant application to a purpose, will more than balance divided numbers, and will easily break a rope of sand."

The *French* have but one town in *Louisiana*, that is *New Orleans*, near the mouth of *Mississippi* river; and only three of any note in *Canada*, *Quebeck*, *Montreal* and *Trois-Rivieres*, which lies between the other two, and all situated on the river of *St. Laurence*: of these three places also,

the two first only are of any consideration. *Quebec* the capital lies about 110 leagues from the mouth of the river *St. Laurence*, is pretty strongly fortified with a fort, four redoubts, and as many batteries on the river, but weak towards the land. Its inhabitants are variously computed, from 10,000 to 15,000, being more than what are found in the other two, besides 500 soldiers.

*Montreal*, sixty leagues higher up the river, is more pleasantly seated, and has three fourths the number of inhabitants, but is not so well fortified. Between these two towns are included all the settlements in *Canada* of any note; that of *Trois-Rivieres*, in the midway, is small and a trifling fortification.

The climate of *Canada* is so cold, that the river *St. Laurence* is not navigable from *October* to *May*, by reason of ice, and the earth so long covered with snow, that the inhabitants have great difficulty to maintain their small stocks of cattle thro' the winter; and the *Indian* trade, which is all the business of the country, takes such numbers of men from labour, that they raise very little grain more than is necessary for their annual subsistence, which frequently falls short. The forces maintained by the King in this country are distributed amongst the small forts in the inland parts, some to the distance of above 1000 miles. Besides those already mentioned, there are four of note. *Fort-Sorel*, where the river of the *Iroquois* or *Richelieu*, which is the discharge of *Lake Champlain*, enters *St. Laurence* river, a little below *Montreal*. *Fort Chambli*, before-mentioned, half way between *Sorel* and *Lake Champlain*, and 100 north by east from *Crown-point*. Thirdly, fort *Frontenac*, mentioned also before, on the lake *Kaderakkui* or *Ontario*, almost due north of  
our

our fort of *Oswego*, and about 60 or 70 miles distant. Lastly, *Denonvill* fort at *Niagra* and that of *Detroit*, on the canal of communication between the *Hurons* and *Erri* lake. They have a few other stackado forts, and one called *St. Ignace*, on the south side of the passage between the *Hurons* and *Missibigan* lake, not far from *Tieodonderagbi* or *Missilimakinak*, where they had one formerly.

From what has been said with respect to *Canada*, the reader may perceive a reason why the *French* are so earnest to encroach on the possessions of their neighbours; and tho' *Louisiana* might make them some amends, yet it lies at so vast a distance, that *Canada*, for many ages to come, can reap but little benefit from it; that is, till the two colonies, by the increase of their respective inhabitants, shall draw closer together.

The distance by land between the two capitals, going, as they are obliged to do, by lakes and rivers, is at least 700 leagues: altho' the direct distance, could it be traveled for woods and morasses, would not be above 450. It is a journey by water of three months, from *Quebek* to *New Orleans*; and three times as much from *New Orleans* to *Quebek*, going against the stream of the *Mississippi*, and other rapid rivers. In all this space there are no more than a few stackado forts, at a great distance from each other, and without any settlements. The distance by sea is equal to that thro' the continent: for to their colonies they have no more than two inlets, the mouth of the *Mississippi*, and that of the river *St. Laurence*, near 1000 leagues asunder; whilst the *English* find admission into theirs by an infinite number of rivers, which fall into the Atlantic ocean within that space, and afford them so many advantages of trade.



But altho' the *French* colonies are far inferior to the *English*, with respect to number of inhabitants, commodious situation, and quality of soil; yet they far exceed them in other advantages. In the first place, the country to the west of *Canada* is the best country for furs in all *America*; for beaver or castor, the farther south, hath less fur, and more hair. This valuable trade they have engrossed almost wholly to themselves, by having all that immense tract of country open to them; while they exclude the *English*, by inclosing them, and shutting up all passages excepting one or two, by which the *Indians* can have access to them. As their whole business almost is their trade with the *Indians*, their young men, for sake of gain, travel and reside among them: nay, they become acquainted with the woods, whence named *Coueurs de Bois*, or wood-rangers; are inured to hardships, become enterprising, and are as good at bush-fighting, as the *Indians* themselves: at home they are mustered and exercised; all excepting ecclesiastics and some others, may be accounted so many soldiers, who are better for the service of that country than their best veteran troops, and even the *Indians* themselves. For this reason, that sort of life is encouraged in *Canada*; and it is a qualification for a young man to make a tour on the lakes, as it is in *Europe* to make a campaign.

The country is divided into signories, and the lands held in fockage, by the tenants, who are thereby obliged, on any occasion, to take up arms for their defence. The whole, being likewise under one general command, the people obey with such alacrity, "That (to use the words of a memorial before me) in case of any attack, they all fly, on the first notice, to the place

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" place of danger, as readily as in a garrison;  
 " on beating or sounding a call."

The *French* fortify also wherever they come, but above all take care to gain the *Indians*; and are now masters, says the same memorial, of all the *Indians* in the eastern part of the continent. For this purpose they constantly keep priests, or other emissaries amongst them; and so naturally conform themselves to the *Indian* ways, as scarce to be distinguished. In fine, they frequently intermarry with them, by which methods they strengthen their interest, and endear themselves to the *Indians*, who are very true to them.

This is the general state of the *French* in *America*, while that of the *British* colonies is too much the reverse. Each is a distinct government wholly independent of the rest, pursuing its own interest and subject to no general command. If we consider their state as to force, we shall find them, for the most part, very weak and defenceless. Above two parts in three of *Nova Scotia* are in the hands of the *French*, who have seized all the north main, and left us only the peninsula: however, we have there *Annapolis*, *Halifax*, and some other thriving settlements, which begin to put on a very good aspect.

*New England* is strong and indifferently well fortified, particularly northward, where it has a chain of forts reaching to *Albany*, which defend a line of 300 miles. Its eastern frontier also, which was tolerably well secured before, has been lately reinforced by the addition of two forts, built last summer, on the banks of the river *Kennibek*.

*New York*, the principal frontier against *Canada*, is provided with no very strong fort in its capital, and wants some to secure the entrance of

its harbour. *Albany* has another fort still less defensible, and at 150 miles distance. There are two regular companies in *British* pay in each fort; but they are too far asunder for mutual defence, or even assistance.

These are all the forts to be found on the *British* main to the south of *Port-Royal*: and to the south of *New York*, for 600 miles together, the coast is unfortified, excepting by its natural shoalness till you come to *Charles-Town*; but lower down we find a few poor ones in *Georgia*, the southern frontier of the *British* territories.

If we consider the strength of the colonies, in respect to military forces, altho' so full of people, we shall find them almost destitute of fighting men. In some colonies there is no appearance at all of a militia; and in some others there may be an appearance of such, but none of service; whatever there are being poorly armed. The sound of war or enemies, says the memorial, especially the *Indians*, is terrible to them. But when we come to enquire for these *Indians*, who were so numerous formerly in the country, and would have been their surest defence, we scarce find any in most of the colonies in the parts inhabited by the *English*; who have made it their business every where, by degrees, to root them out, either by making war on them, or setting their several nations or tribes at variance among themselves. It may not be amiss, therefore, to set forth the defenceless state of the colonies in this particular.

The inland parts of the northern main of *Nova Scotia*, and the country between that and the river *Kennebek*, bounding *New England*, having never been settled by either *French* or *English*, is possessed by the several tribes of the *Abenákki* or *Abnakki*

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*Abnakki Indians*, who were the natural inhabitants of *New England*, and are inveterate enemies to it, on account of former quarrels; which has reduced them to the number of about 640. In the peninsula there are a few tribes of *Mikmaks*, called formerly by the *French* *Souriquois*.

In *New England* there are but a very few *Indians* left, almost all having been destroyed by the wars, or driven out; part into the country eastward, which are those just now mentioned, and part into the territories of the *French*, to whom they are firmly attached; excepting the tribes who in 1749 came voluntarily, 'tis said, and submitted to the governor of *New York*.

This last province has very few *Indians* belonging to it, unless we reckon for such the *Six Nations*, who are said to be settled within the province, and more properly under its protection: those were formerly a numerous people, 10 or 12,000 strong, but at present it is thought that they do not exceed 1500 fighting men.

*New Jersey* has very few *Indians*, and none who could be of service in war. *Pensylvania* has 6 or 700; but half of them are *Shawanons*; who to avoid molestation from their neighbours, leaving their habitations along the river which is called by their name in the *French* maps, and falls into the *Ohio*, removed to the river *Susquehanna* in that province: but being menaced by the six nations for mischief done on *Delaware* river, in 1728 returned to the *Ohio*, where many *Delawares* had gone before for sake of hunting; and two years after, by the persuasions of a *French* emissary, put themselves wholly under protection of the *French*; which they signified at their return, by hoisting a *French* flag at their town:

however, at present they for the general are, or pretend to be, friends to the *English*.

In *Maryland* there are a few *Indians* called *Nantikoks*, on the east shore; but on the other side scarce any at all. In *Virginia* they have none in the parts inhabited by the *English*, but live in separate towns. In *Carolina* they were formerly very numerous; but the *English*, says the memorial of 1732, made it their policy to *play one nation against another*, till they all became exceedingly reduced, altho' considerable numbers still remain. Mr. Neal says \* the *English* were so wise as to do the same by the *Indians* of *New England*. By this false step, as well as horrid policy, they have greatly distressed instead of relieving themselves; for, as the country backwards, as well as forwards, lies open to an invader, in case the *French* should pour in their numerous tribes of *Indians* on them, what devastation and ruin would be made, for want of other *Indians* acquainted with their way of making war to oppose them? So that it is to be feared, that upon such an invasion, the first thing they would have occasion to repent, would be the destruction of their own *Indians*. Besides, as there are in the southern Colonies three or four blacks to one white, what danger might not be apprehended from these poor unhappy wretches, (who, provoked by even a worse than *Egyptian* slavery, have two or three times formed dangerous conspiracies to destroy their masters,) in case of such an invasion, especially if their masters were obliged to march to defend their frontiers, and leave their families behind.

'Tis true, the memorialist, to palliate the barbarity of his neighbour countrymen, says, that these *Indians* are, for the general, an *unsteady faithless people*: yet acknowledges, "that they may  
" be

\* Hist. New Engl. Vol. II. p. 2.



be governed by their interest, and may be useful while they can be kept friends." Whose fault then is it if they be not friends? And, if "by their barbarity, insidious attacks, and swiftness in the woods, they are terrible enemies;" are not these reasons why they should be made our friends? What is more in their favour, he owns, "that the *French* fully understand their importance; and managing for them in their enterprises, will have very great dependence on their assistance." I am sorry the *English* do not understand their importance, and how to manage them as well as the *French*; but it is a fatal truth, that they either do not, or will not; excepting those of *Pensylvania*, who never experienced any treachery from their *Indians*, but have always lived in harmony with them. And, how comes that? the reason is plain; because the inhabitants of that province, who are for the most part Quakers, acting strictly up to their own and true christian principles, never deprived them of their lands without paying for them, defrauded them of their goods, or gave them any other gross provocations, as the *English* of other provinces have done to their *Indians*.

'Tis true, the *Indians* never forgive very grievous injuries till satisfaction be made them. The same principles influenced the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*. It is, indeed, the necessary result of liberty, and so inseparable from it, that wherever it is wanting in any nation, once possessed of it, it is a sure sign that they have degenerated, and are hastening to their downfall. But altho' a just sense of liberty makes the *Indians* impatient of wrongs, the simplicity of their manners, and strict attachment to justice, renders them cautious of giving offences. In reality, if we look into the history

of the Colonies, which comes to our hands, tho' very imperfect, and often partial in favour of the *English*, we shall find that all the considerable wars or slaughters made by the *Indians* in the Colonies, have been owing to the provocations given them, either by seizing their lands, or mal-treating them in trade or otherwise.

Capt. *Weymouth*, who sailed for *Virginia* in 1606, landed on *Long Island*, and found the natives more affable and courteous than those to the southward; but the adventurers, thro' greediness of gain, over-reaching the *Indians* in their traffick, it begat a jealousy, which, we are told, was the source of the many murders and massacres which happened afterwards; of which two had like to have ruined the settlement in its infancy, the first in 1622, when near 400 *English* were slain, the second in 1639, wherein they lost above 500. This last was on account of lands taken from them. The enterprizes of the *Virginia* settlers afterwards, in 1670, for making discoveries to the west of that province, in the *Ohio* country, greatly alarmed them; and believing their design was to extirpate them, they endeavoured to cut them off by way of prevention.

The *English* were in danger of being destroyed at their first settling in *New England* in 1620, on account of the villainy of one Capt. *Hunt*, who had carried away 20 of the natives but a little before: however, they became reconciled when convinced that *Hunt* was declared a villain by the *English*. This shews that they are not implacable, but content with reasonable amends: yet the disorders of some of the first settlers renewed their disgust; and the violences committed by their posterity, when they grew stronger, brought the Colony to the brink of ruin more than once,

witness

witness these two dreadful wars of the *Pequots* and King *Philip*, the first in 1637, the latter in 1676. About the same time the *English*, who had settled in the country, east of *Kennebek* river, drew a war on themselves, in which many were cut off by the *Amonoskoggin* and *Penobskot* Indians. Mr. *Neal* says \* “they cheated the natives in the most “ open and barefaced manner imaginable, and “ treated them like slaves.”

The *Indians*, especially those of *Sako* and *Amonoskoggin* complained, that the *English* refused to pay the yearly tribute of corn agreed on in the late articles of peace: that they not only had taken away their lands, but obstructed their fishing in the rivers, and sent their cattle into their fields to destroy their corn: that the governor had granted away their lands, and that the traders made them drunk and cheated them. “Abuses,” says Mr. *Neal*, which those who trade much “with them, are seldom innocent of,”† and these intollerable grievances were retaliated with the most shocking cruelties, mostly on the innocent. As almost all the calamities of this kind which have afflicted the Colonies, were brought on them chiefly by the insolence and knavery of the traders, ought not those people to be laid under the strictest regulations to prevent such evils for the future?

In 1680, *Carolina* Colony was on the point of being ruined by the council abusing the *Indians*, “whom in prudence, says Mr. *Archdale*, (afterwards himself of the council and governor) they “ought to have obliged, in the highest degree; “and so brought on an *Indian* war, like that in “the first planting of *Virginia*, in which many “*English* were cut off.” Yet this did not hinder others

\* Hist. *New Engl.* Vol. II. p. 24.

† Hist. *New Engl.* p. 53.

others from pursuing more injurious measures ; for about the year 1700, the practice of seizing and selling *Indians* for slaves became more common than ever in this province ; nay, governor *Moor* gave commissions to people to kill, destroy, and take all *Indians* they could for his own profit, which had like to have brought on another *Indian* war. This Colony still continued to abuse the *Indians* by fraudulent and compulsive dealing in trade, which, at length, about 1718, provoked the *Spanish* *Indians* to begin a new war, cutting off many *English* in the out settlements ; who, tho' assisted by other Colonies, were forced to give up their charter, and put themselves under the protection of *England* before they could quell them. This war continued till 1732, when peace was made. I could, from good authority, mention some pranks committed by the traders of *South Carolina* among the *Cherokees* in 1744, which caused a great tumult, and might have proved the loss of those numerous allies : in short, if we may believe Col. *Beverly*, in his history of *Virginia*, " the *English* found the *Indians* (in that " country) as in all other places, very fair and " courteous at first, till they got more knowledge " of them, and, perhaps, thought themselves " over-reached." From all which, I think, it appears but too plainly, that the extirpation of the *Indians*, thro' the Colonies, is to be imputed to the faults of the *English* rather than those of the *Indians*.

In short, we have scarce any *Indians* left within the Colonies who are able to be of any service to us ; and of those numerous natives, who surround them without, we can reckon on none in the northern parts but the six nations and their dependents, who are yet the chief defence of the northern

northern Colonies against the other *Indians*; and in the southern the *Katawbabs* about 300, the *Cherokees* 3 or 4000, the *Chikeseaws* 300, and the *Creeks* 1000; all the rest are either in the interest, or under restraint of the *French*; such as the *Mingos* or *Delawars*, the *Shawanons* and *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis*, who inhabit the country of the *Ohio*.

To the disadvantages above-mentioned, which the Colonies labour under, let us add another, namely, that of their large rivers and waters, over which there is no passage, except by ferrys; so that the lands between may be entered, either from the sea or back parts, and the inhabitants of one part plundered before those of another could be able to assist them. Of this *North Carolina*, in the late war, felt an instance; for, in 1748, two *Spanish* privateers running up *Cape Fear* river, plundered the town of *Brunswick*, and carried off six vessels. Another ascended *Delawar* river to within a few miles of *Philadelphia*. What mischief might not have been done, had they been daring fellows?

If we pass from the continent to the islands in the *West Indies*, we shall find matters still worse, for the power of the *French* has grown to a surprising degree, by their encroachments on *Hispaniola*, and fortifying their islands; which they have in greater number than the *English*, whose strength is every where as much decreased. *Martinico*, which, about the beginning of this century, was invaded at pleasure by the *English*, is now grown exceeding strong both in forts and fighting men, which last are said to be 12000; while *Barbadoes*, the chief of the *Caribbee* islands, is as much sunk in its strength as the other is grown. When *du Ruyter* came against it in 1675,

the



the inhabitants had 10,000 men in arms, besides sufficient numbers to take care of the plantations.

“ Since then, says a memorial before me, by  
 “ sickness and their practice of employing as few  
 “ whites as possible, their militia became reduced  
 “ to 6000 and 200 horse, which for many years  
 “ was reckoned their complement; but now [in  
 “ 1732] they scarce exceed half that number,  
 “ yet still they continue very opulent and tempt-  
 “ ing to an enemy: for, from that island alone,  
 “ on a conquest of it, might be had a booty in  
 “ Negroes, which, if transported, would yield,  
 “ among the *Spaniards*, one million *sterl.* besides  
 “ all other riches.”

“ The other *British* isles seem to languish like  
 “ it, not thro’ poverty, but that fatal canker  
 “ luxury, and a lawless administration, which  
 “ have too generally proved the forerunners of  
 “ destruction.” — After observing that their  
 forts and magazines are not only neglected but  
 suffered to run to ruin, the memorialist adds,  
 “ that if the islands are to be preserved, without  
 “ remarkable providences in their favour, it must  
 “ be by measures very different from those which  
 “ have been taken of late years.”

The reason why such strange disorders have  
 so long subsisted in the Colonies is, by the *Ame-  
 ricans* supposed to be their not having come to  
 the knowledge of the government here, thro’  
 the ignorance of some men and craft of others,  
 whose interest it was to conceal them.

In a memorial, now before me, written about  
 the year 1732, by a gentleman of the northern  
 Colonies, after setting forth how improbable it  
 is for the people of *Great Britain* to come ac-  
 quainted with *American* affairs by the common ca-  
 nals of information, “ Upon the whole, says he,

“ it will evidently appear, if we may judge from  
 “ the conduct and management of *American* af-  
 “ fairs, that they have been very little under-  
 “ stood, otherwise it is scarce possible to imagine  
 “ that they would be suffered to run into their  
 “ present condition.”

This is the state of the *British* Colonies in *Ame-  
 rica*; by which it appears that every thing which  
 tends to their security has been neglected, and  
 every thing which tends to their ruin, or to  
 give the *French* advantage of them, pursued.  
 This has been observed by the *French* writers  
 themselves. *Charlevoix* takes notice \*, that the  
*English* surpass all other *Europeans* in the art of  
 establishing Colonies: but adds, “ that they take  
 “ very little care to secure them against a sur-  
 “ prize, or the attack of an enemy. So that,  
 continues he, “ if the *French* had as much perse-  
 “ verance, and were as well skilled in preserving,  
 “ as hardy and quick in making their conquests  
 “ in the new world, the crown of *England* would  
 “ not by this time, perhaps, have a single inch of  
 “ ground in *North America*.” Would not one  
 imagine that the *French* have profited by this au-  
 thor's reflection, and are firmly resolved to correct  
 the fault which he finds in their former conduct?

However that be, he finds another error in the  
 management of the *English*, already taken notice  
 of. He says, “ that being mixed with foreigners  
 “ of all nations, they apply themselves wholly  
 “ to the cultivation of lands and their commerce,  
 “ which renders them unfit for war: and hence,  
 “ continues he, proceeds the contempt which  
 “ the savages have for them; a handful of whom  
 “ hath for a long time kept in awe their most  
 “ populous and flourishing Colonies.” He adds,  
 “ All

\* Vol. II. p. 197.

" All their security lay in our inconstancy, our  
 " levity, our negligence and want of harmony  
 " among our commanders. It is by this means,  
 " concludes *Charlevoix*, that they have remained  
 " masters of so many important posts; out  
 " of which we have driven them as often as  
 " we have attacked them." There has been  
 but too much ground for this bravado since that  
 author wrote, whatever there might have been  
 before: what is more, he has had not only  
 the satisfaction to see his remark confirmed by  
 his countrymen driving us out of almost all  
 those important posts again; but also the plea-  
 sure to find that they have mended of the fault  
 with which he accused them about thirty years  
 ago of not preserving their Colonies: for to our  
 shame be it spoken, they have kept every im-  
 portant place which they had taken, and likewise  
 greatly improved their advantages by building  
 forts, not only upon, but far within our frontiers.

This is their glory; this is our disgrace. The  
 point now in question is how to wipe off the  
 stain and retrieve our affairs. The proper way,  
 indeed, to remove the external evils, would be  
 to cure the internal one, which was the cause of  
 them: but as there is not time sufficient for that,  
 while the enemy is already at the gates, our first  
 care must be to drive them from thence, and re-  
 cover our lost trade as well as territories: after  
 which let them apply seriously to reform abuses  
 within, and put the Colonies on a footing, which  
 may prevent their falling into the same unhappy  
 circumstances any more. Unless the last of those  
 two expedients be stedfastly resolved on we had as  
 good look on still without concern, and suffer the  
*French* to continue their encroachments! for, to  
 what purpose will it be to put the nation to a great  
 expence,

expence, both of blood and treasure, only to do what *Charlevoix* upbraids his countrymen with having done, lose in a little time again what may be with great difficulty acquired? As the *French* have mended of that fault, it is hoped their example will prevail on us to mend too.

### III.

*Means of frustrating the French designs, without going to war.*

TO defeat the designs of our good neighbours, we have choice of two methods, either (1) to drive them out of their unjust acquisitions by force of arms, as they have entered, or (2) to settle and built forts upon them.

If the first course be pursued (and surely we have provocations enough of all kinds to chuse what course we please) we cannot do better than follow the rules of their own scheme; that is, to take their capital *Quebek*, and finish the war at once. Preparatory to which, the proper way would be to sweep all the country south of the river *St. Lawrence*, clear of the *French*, and demolish their settlements! This is the shortest, most effectual method, and what will put the nation to least expence. Each place affords almost the same conveniency of being attacked. We may as easily conduct ships to *Quebek*, as the *French* can to *New York*. The expeditions of *Kirk*, and *Phips* shew this; and then an *English* army must take the very same rout thro' the country from *New York* to *Quebek*, which the *French* must take from *Quebek* to *New York*.

The

The *English* always looked on the *French* possessions in *Canada*, as well as *Acadia*, to be an encroachment on their rights. This appears from Queen *Ann*'s manifesto, published in *Canada* in 1711, as well as from the *English* conquest and attempts against that country, set forth in a late pamphlet.\*

An expedition of this nature might be effectuated with fewer ships and men, than were furnished towards the intended expedition in 1747. "and if rightly calculated, well and truly executed, in all human probability, to use the words of a proposal now before me, on this subject, could not fail of success, and would acquire to *Britain* all she wants on the continent of *North America*. The whole sea coast on the *Atlantic* ocean, and fishery, from *Florida*, as far north as it is habitable, as well as all the inland country throughout its now unknown extent, would be hers: every *Indian* would be clothed with her manufactures; and every beast be her property: all his majesty's subjects, in that part of the world, would dwell in peace; and, by their natural encrease, become such a nursery of people to him, and his successors, that from thence they may raise a force (perhaps in less than half a century) which, by a right direction, might be able to put them in possession of any southern colony, now in the hands of our enemies." After removing the inhabitants to *Europe*, part of the country may be cantoned out in property to the soldiers who served in the expedition, or otherwise disposed of; fur

\* See the Conduct of the *French* with regard to *Nova Scotia*.



and the fur and peltry trade alone, in a few years, would defray the expence of the expedition with interest.

In case *Canada* was attacked, the settled inhabitants or planters, who having been originally *Huguenots*, are still suspected, are obliged to till the ground and undergo other hard labour, would probably join the *English*. The *French* troops themselves are so miserably kept, and so weary of the country as well as of the drudgery they go through, that with proper encouragement of places to settle in they might be brought to desert to us in great numbers; as they did in the late war, and have done also since the present bickerings began, by 20 or 30 at a time. For this reason, in case an expedition should at any time be resolved on, it would be proper to disperse manifestos among the *French*; promising them good lands and the privileges of *Englishmen*, if they would come and settle amongst us: should this take effect, it would be an easy way of putting an end to the war, and the *French* colonies at once.

The *French* commanders at *Quebek*, to prevent the desertion of their soldiers, have at times proposed to the colonies not to receive deserters; or else to give them up afterwards in exchange for other prisoners: but they have always wisely rejected a measure which tended only to benefit the *French* and hurt themselves. Indeed no proposal made by the *French* ought to be accepted till it be first maturely weighed and considered; for it is a maxim with them never to make any by which they do not gain abundantly more than they lose.

The *English* in *America* have lost many opportunities of taking *Canada*, and driving the *French* quite out, when they were not the sixth part so

strong as they are now. In 1688, when their whole force was scarce 2000 men, the *Six Nations*, (then only five) to be revenged on the *Marquis de Nouville*, who had invaded the *Senneka's* country the year before, surprized the island of *Montreal*, which they entered on the south side, they burnt all the plantations, and massacred above 1000 *French* people, besides carrying away 26 prisoners, the greater part of whom were burnt alive. The five nations lost no more than three men in this expedition, who got drunk and were left behind. In *October* following they invaded *Montreal* a second time, and having destroyed the lower part of the island, carried away many prisoners. If only *New York* had performed her engagements at this time to the five nations; or they had understood the method of attacking forts, 1688 would have been as memorable in *America* for the destruction of *Canada*, as it is in *Great Britain* for the banishment of arbitrary power.

The revolution which happened at the time when the five nations triumphed over *Canada*, seemed to be a favourable conjunction for them: It is but reasonable to think, that having been too powerful for the *French* when assisted by all the western *Indian* nations, and the *English* stood neuter, that now when those nations had made peace with them, and the *English* joined in the war, the *French* would not be able to stand one campaign: but the party divisions which ensued, at a time when harmony might have been expected, occasioned by the bad choice of governors sent over, lost them that opportunity also \*. There were several other opportunities of distress-

\* *Colden's Hist. of the Five Nations*, p. 91, 94.

sing, and perhaps of disabling, if not of quite subduing the enemy, had the southern colonies, as by treaty obliged, assisted, between that year and the peace of *Ryswick* in 1697, during which time the five nations continued the war alone against *Canada*, and often ravaged its borders as far as the river *St. Laurence*, keeping the *French* all the while in continual alarms and inexpressible terror. They had so great an antipathy to them at that time, that tho' greatly reduced by the war they would have had the *English* to continue it till they had completed the conquest of *Canada*, in which they affirmed there was no manner of difficulty. But the colonies were then blind to their interest, and those times are no more. If we would drive out the *French* at this time of day, we must employ a very large force, and expect great opposition.

'Tis true great forces, even more than necessary were employed in the expeditions of 1690 and 1710, the first under Sir *William Phips*, the second under General *Nicholson*; yet both miscarried, one by very silly, the other by very bad, if not, as some will have it by very wicked management: for the force which was in the fleet, in the opinion of the best judges, was sufficient not only to have taken *Quebek*, but to have driven the *French* out of all their settlements in *America*. The *New England* historian says, this expedition failed "by the treachery of those who were at the head of it;" and Mr. *Harley* in his letter to Queen *Anne*, accuses the managers with setting it on foot partly to put 20,000 pounds in their pockets; which secret he says was discovered on the fleet's return. With respect to *Phips's* conduct, *La Hontan*, who was then at *Quebek*, says,

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sing,

“ It was so bad, that he could not have done less  
 “ than he did if he had been hired by the *French*  
 “ to stand still with his hands in his pockets:  
 “ that if they had come directly against the town  
 “ it would have surrendered, having had only  
 “ 12 great guns, very little ammunition, and  
 “ few forces : but they were so dilatory in their  
 “ consultations at a distance, that the *French* had  
 “ time to reinforce the place, which Sir *William*  
 “ bombarded with four vessels and did damage  
 “ to the value of five or six pistoles.” The mis-  
 carriage was owing likewise to his setting out too  
 late in the year, and the 2500 land forces, from  
*Albany*, who were to attack *Montreal* in order to  
 divide the *French* forces, not proceeding.

How the late expedition, set on foot in 1746,  
 would have succeeded in case it had gone for-  
 ward, there is no possibility of determining : but  
 in all probability the reduction of *Canada* was not  
 really intended at this time, by the government  
 here. However, some amends would have been  
 made for the great expence which this stratagem  
 put the nation to, in case the colonies had taken  
 the *French* fort at *Crown-point*, as was intended,  
 with the forces which they had raised : but as it  
 owed its foundation to misunderstandings among  
 the governments ; so the same cause prevented its  
 being demolished, when there was a fair oppor-  
 tunity for doing it : and this must generally be  
 the case till there is a union established among  
 them, at least for their mutual defence.

If the second method be chosen, in order if  
 possible to prevent an open war, our business will  
 be to follow the example of the *French* in this  
 also ; and build forts on our own frontiers as well  
 as they, and at a small distance from theirs (in  
 the same manner as they have done at *Sbegnikto*  
 in

in *Nova Scotia*) in all places where they have incroached on our territories : but this must be done under cover of strong forces ; for to be sure they will not suffer it, if they can possibly prevent it. But supposing the thing possible to be effected without coming to blows, we must not stop here, but must go on settling and building strong forts in all the countries which we lay claim to, and intend to keep : barely making settlements will not do, as some have imagined, however able we may be to out-settle them. The weakness of this notion has been proved to our cost ; since we find the *French* have in one season, broken up above 160 families of settlements and residents which we had in the western parts of *Virginia*, along the *Ohio* and other rivers, and even taken the fort which we had raised. But it is not to be imagined that they would have ventured to attack those settlements had they been well secured by forts erected in proper places ; much less have made so great a progress in so short a time.

If therefore we would secure our *American* dominions against the *French*, we must *out-fort*, as well as *out-settle* them. Our colonies are in a worse condition by far than is generally believed, or can well be conceived, unable to hurt their invaders or defend themselves ; while the *French* have forts every where, and we have forts, in a manner, no where.

The number of forts necessary to be built for securing the colonies must be estimated by the number of forts already built by the *French* on our frontiers, and the places proper for fortifying, which they have left unoccupied, which are indeed very few ; so industrious they have been to

anticipate us in an article of such infinite concern to our plantations.

As the country of the *Ohio* is in so much danger of being wrested from us ; and its being well secured of so much importance to all the colonies in general, north, south and middle, as hath been already set forth : if ever it comes into our hands again, it ought to be well fortified by building forts in convenient places along the river, especially at each extremity ; that is, one at the mouth of the *Ohio* on the *Mississippi*, and another at *Niawgra* near the lake *Ontario* : this last will prevent the communication of *Louisiana* with *Canada* by that lake and the *Erri*, and oblige the *French* to abandon their forts on the south east side of this last lake, by rendering them useless, as well as save us the expence of erecting a fort at *Tierondoquot*, on the lake of *Ontario*, about 60 miles to the east of the *Niawgra* strait : a place which they have long had their eye upon for building a fort, and which we might be under a necessity of fortifying in case the *French* remain at *Niawgra*, in order to prevent their taking possession of it, as they did once already in 1687, altho' it was but for a short time : and this doubtless was the reason which made governor *Clarke* of *New York* so earnest to have that place fortified.

In effect a *French* fort there would prove no less dangerous to *New York*, than that at *Crown-Point* ; as it would give them admission into the country of the *Sennekas*, the most powerful of the six nations : among whom they have already gotten some footing by means of the *Niawgra* fort and their priests ; and whose defection, considering their influence, might be a means of our losing the friendship of the other five.

The



The fort at the mouth of the *Obio*, ought to be strongly built and garrisoned, and a considerable settlement made about it: after this settlements might be gradually carried on between the *Mississippi*, and the *Alligany* mountains, backwards and forwards, at the same time. Nor can too much encouragement be given to settle this country, especially on the side of the *Mississippi*, as quick as possible, by allowing people liberty to settle how and where they please, without making large grants to any company; an obstacle which has hindered settling more than any other thing, and on many accounts proved greatly detrimental to the colonies; by raising the price of lands to an exorbitant degree, which besides the dangerous evil of enriching a few and impoverishing many, has been attended with one still more pernicious, that is of weakening the colonies by leaving near half of some of them unpeopled.

This fort and settlement would effectually exclude the *French* from passing into the western parts of *Virginia*, by the *Obio* and its branches: But as they have two forts on the *Wabash*, one at its mouth on the *Obio*, and another about the middle of that river, it would be proper to have two others built in opposition to them: the second in the part where it draws near the river of the *Illinois* or *Cbiktagbiks*. Should we go a little farther and erect another on this last river, in the neighbourhood of the former, it would entirely cut off their communication this way between *Louisiana* and *Canada*; and oblige them to go so far about, as to discourage them, with all their sanguine views and perseverance, from ever hoping to compass their so much desired project of joining their two colonies, on this side of the *Mississippi*.

The country to the south of the *Ohio*, would be in good measure secured by the fort built at the mouth of it, which will hinder their passage into the *Hogebege*, or river of the *Charokees*, dividing the country of these *Indians* on the north from *Virginia*. However, more effectually to secure it, and at the same time cover the country of the *Charokees*, it would be proper to build one at the falls a little below the place where the *Pellessipi* or *Clinches* river joins it, in the north west borders of the *Charokees*; and another especially, in the heart of the country possessed by those people, who have long applied with great earnestness to the governor of *Carolina* for that purpose, representing the danger which otherwise there was of the *French* doing the same: and it is well, if thro' this unpardonable neglect, the *French* in case they should be forced out of the back parts of *Virginia*, do not in their return to *New Orleans*, put that design in execution: as to be sure they will in case they keep possession of what they have already usurped, in order to prevent any attempts on our side to secure that country to us. By a like pernicious remissness, or something else, were they suffered since the year 1715 to build the fort *Toulouse* on the river *Alibamous*, not far from the country of the *Creek Indians*, and the borders of *Georgia*; which frontier, tho' not yet sufficient fortified, has balked their views of carrying on their chain of forts on that side to the Atlantic ocean, which before that colony was founded they thought themselves sure of effecting whenever they pleased, and therefore made the less haste to accomplish it.

These forts might serve at present to fortify the southern provinces of our *American* dominions: with regard to our northern, the first thing which

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demands our attention is the security of *New York* and its province. This will be, in good measure, done by the fort to be built at *Niawgra*, and that already built at *Oswégo*, in the country of the six nations, at the south east end of the lake *Kadarakai* or *Ontario*, almost due south of the *French* fort of *Frontenac*, on the north east corner of the same lake about 70 miles distant. But this fort, which is the only one we have for defence of our back settlements for many hundred miles, till we come to *Georgia*, ought to be much enlarged, strongly fortified, and furnished with a pretty numerous garrison, as it is of great consequence by its situation, to both the security and trade of our northern colonies; it being our north western frontier and the only place or opening left by which the *Indians* can come to us with their furs. For this reason, till such time as our neighbours shall be obliged by either fair means or foul to allow them a free passage thro' the lakes, it will be necessary to build a vessel or two, capable of mounting guns, for the conveniency of carrying them backwards and forwards across the lake; which expedient will go a great way to frustrate the design of the *French* and recover our trade.

And here it is worth observing that this fort of *Oswégo*, built by governor *Burnet* in 1727, by favour of the *Indians*, stood unmolessted all the last war; and altho' the garrison usually consists of no more than an officer and 23 men, has been of more service and benefit than all the rest, altho' now it must be in imminent danger. This is a demonstrative proof of the great importance and advantage of such forts, on the number of which small garrisons, properly placed, the interest

terest and support of the *French* almost wholly depend.

However more effectually to secure *New York*, a strong fort ought to be built in view of the *French* fort at *Crown-Point*. By means of this post they may be enabled to intercept, or at least disturb the trade from *Albaney* up the *Moboks* river, a branch of *Hudson's*, to the six nations, by sending a force on that side; and could they destroy the commerce of those *Indians* with the province of *New York*, they would oblige them to depend wholly on *Canada*; a thing which they threatened to have done in 1732.

During the late *French* war from 1744 to 48, *Crown-Point* was the rendezvous of the *Canada*, *French* and their *Indians*, from whence they attacked *New York* and the north west corner of *Massachusetts's* bay. From this place in 1745 they destroyed *Saratoga* settlement on *Hudson's* river, about 30 miles above *Albaney*. In which parts during that and the two following years they killed and captivated above 300 of our people\*; destroying most of the inhabitants and plantations on the north east branch of that river. In former wars the attack on *New England* was from the north eastward, in the war of 1746 it was from *Crown-Point*. *New York* government in former *French* wars did not suffer, but in this last they suffered much†; that is, they were punished for suffering that fort to be built. Besides building this counter fort, *Albaney* ought to be put in the best posture of defence imaginable, in order to secure it against any attempts on that

\* *Dougl. Summary, North Amer. vol. ii. p. 246.*

† The same, Vol. i. p. 316.

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side. This quarter requires the strongest barriers, because the *French* have declared it to be the chief object of their views; and it lies so near *Quebek* the center of all their strength in *Canada*, from which they have a most convenient passage all by water, excepting a small space of about 12 miles by land.

Mr. *Callieres* who first proposed the project for the conquest of this city, to induce *Lewis XIV.* to comply with their earnest desires, says in his *Memoirs* to the *French* ministers, "That this conquest would make the king master of one of the finest ports in *America*, which they might enter at all times; and a most beautiful country, in a mild and fertile climate!" No wonder so inviting a description as this, should set the *French* of *Canada* a longing for *New York*: but ought not that longing of theirs to make us more earnest to preserve it?

By these fortifications *New England* will be pretty well secured on the west side, as it will on the east by those already built, and the two now building on the river *Kennebek*, one by the province, the other by the proprietors of the *Kennebek* purchase; whose generous example it is hoped will animate others to do the like, and not let them stop, till they have erected a fortress on the very banks of *St. Laurence* river, which is within their limits. Mean time, as the last of the two new forts, has been founded so high as the *Takonnek* falls, and the north part of *New England* lies wholly exposed to the ravages of an enemy; it is not to be doubted but that they will not delay to build a third at the head of the *Kennebek* itself, in the carrying place; not above four miles over, where it locks with the river called by the *French* *La Gbaudiere*; which falls into the *St. Laurence* four

four or five leagues to the south west of *Quebek*. This fort should be strongly built, and furnished from *Britain* with a garrison of 500 stout men : unless this be done, the building those two forts will only serve to put the *French* in mind of doing it. And from their conduct it may be judged, that a smaller occasion would serve them for a pretence.

The building a fort here is the more necessary on three accounts; (1) as it will bridle the *Abenaki* Indians in the interest of the *French*, and hinder them from ever attempting any thing against *New England*; this having always been the place of rendezvous for both on such occasions. It will also prevent their going on the *Ohio* expedition; and those restraints, by degrees, be a means of their coming over to our interest. (2) As it lies near the heads of the rivers *St. Francis* and *St. John*, as well as of the *Kennebek* and *La Chaudiere* before-mentioned: so that it will have the command of four very important rivers, two of which fall into the *St. Laurence*; the *Chaudiere* towards *Kebek*, and the *St. Francis* towards *Montreal*. (3) As it will help to cover not only the northern borders of *New England*, but also those of *New York*, from which it will not be far distance. I may venture to say, that the good effect of this fort will extend as far as *Annapolis Royal*, and the town of *Halifax* in *Nova Scotia*; by cutting off all supplies of men and stores to the *French* in that country, by *St. John's* river, which will oblige them to abandon their forts lately built at the mouth of it. The *Kennebek* company in full expectation of this desirable event, have already given land to 100 men and their families, to settle the country thereabout, under

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protection of the two forts newly built upon that river.

How different is the practice in some colonies to this generous publick-spirited conduct of the *Kennebek* proprietors! The assembly of *New York*, in their address to governor *de Lancey*, the 20th of *August* last, complains, "that other colonies make themselves strong and defensible, by settling in townships, or some other close order. While our frontier lands are granted away in patents almost without bounds or number, regardless of settlements, or the publick welfare." And in a state of the *British* settlements, now in view, we are told, that even "the lands between *New York* itself and *Albany*, on both sides of *Hudson's* river, by an abuse which ought to be remedied, viz. the old exorbitant grants, are but thinly inhabited; altho' lands for settlement in that colony are extremely wanted, and those tracts would soon be purchased, if they could be had at any tolerable rates."

This unpeopled state of the country is of so much the worse consequence, since in case the *French* should attack *Albany* and *New York* at the same time, one by sea and the other by land, conformably to their plan, from whence, could *Albany* be reinforced? the country has not men to supply it, nor could *York*, in such a case, be able to spare any. On this occasion the memorial of 1732, observes, "that when the present state of *New York* and the power of those neighbours, [the *French*] is well understood, it will too evidently appear, that they will, on a rupture, be under unhappy circumstances; and with them the other colonies must be deeply involved." Such enfeebling grants therefore are of pernicious tendency every where, but no where so much as in pro-

province of *New York*; which being the key of all the other colonies, and most exposed to our northern neighbours, who for these reasons covet it, all means which can be thought of conducive either to its improvement or security, ought to be applied; and every the least obstacle to either ought to be removed.

After the words cited from the assembly's address, they justly remark, "we can erect forts and block-houses, but to what end? woods and uncultivated tracts are not the objects of security. Industry is to be protected, and men's persons to be defended; otherwise little good will accrue to the publick, be the expence what it will." 'Tis true, there can be no prospect of settling a country while such discouraging grants are in the way: but were those obstacles removed, under the protection of such forts as have been proposed, in a very short time we might hope to see this part well inhabited, and consequently the strongest barrier (as it ought to be) in the *English American* dominions against the *French*.

With regard to *Nova Scotia*, including the country to the east of *Kennibek* river, it will require several forts and settlements to secure it, not only at the mouths of the three principal rivers *Penobskot*, *La Croix*, and *St. John's*, at which last there are two *French* forts: but also at certain posts along those rivers, particularly this last; which beginning not far from the head of the *Kennibek*, and passing with a circular course, encompasseth the greater and most valuable part of all the country; so that those forts will keep both *French* and *Indians* in awe; as they will have an easy communication by water among themselves, and with the settlements on the other rivers, travelling only a little way by land.

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Above all, care must be taken to build a strong fort at *Sbegnikto* on some elevated ground to the north of the *French* fort, which may both command and exceed it in force; for the present fort is so weak, and ill situated, that the garrison would be obliged to surrender almost at the first shot; so that in case of a war we should have no chance there. Nor will this be enough: it will be necessary for securing it to have two forts more; one at *Bay Verte* to prevent our neighbours from invading the country at pleasure, that being their landing place from *Canada*; and one of the two ways by which they enter and correspond with *Nova Scotia*: *St. John's* river, as before-mentioned, is the other, by which (says *La Hontan*) the inhabitants of those two countries may hear from each other in 16 or 17 days, tho' not in a month by sea.

The second fort ought to be erected at the entrance into *Sbegnikto* basin or harbour; for, should the *French* build one there, they would exclude all access to it by sea.

But, as the erecting so many forts at once in this province (of *Nova Scotia*) may be thought too expensive a work, it may be sufficient for the present, only to build some along the river *St. John* and those at *Sbegnikto*.

By such a number of forts and settlements as I have mentioned, may the *British* territories be effectually secured, the *French* kept at a distance, and our trade in good measure recovered by passages opened for the *Indians* to come and trade with the colonies; which will likewise be at liberty to extend their settlements on all sides, in spite of any opposition which the *French* can give them; or rather without danger of any from them: for, by means of these forts a much stronger line of cir-

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circumvallation will be formed against them, than they at present have against us.

You will say, perhaps, that I have cut out a fine expensive work for the colonies. It will be expensive, there is no doubt of that: but, what can be done, supposing fewer forts will not be sufficient to secure them? If therefore the burthen falls heavy, they may thank their own mismanagements. Had forts been gradually built on their frontiers, and as they extended their out settlements, after the example of the *French*, a thing which ought to have been done, the charge would not have been felt. As this has been neglected, that must be done at once, which should have been done at different times. Besides, the expence is greatly augmented by their having suffered the *French* to build upon them, every where. At first a few forts erected in proper places would have served the purpose, and their neighbours finding the possessions secured, might never have thought of disturbing them: But seeing the countries lie open, and the colonies careless thro' a vain security, or worse, covetousness, they were invited to enter, and punish their neglect in the manner they have done.

The *French* too unwilling either to quit the possession of what they have gotten, no matter how unjustly, or lose the great expences which they have been at to build so many forts, will doubtless dispute every inch of ground as long as they can, and when driven out of one place fortify another, with a view, if possible, to tire us out.

No wonder, then, that the expence to the colonies of securing themselves, should be very great; but if it was to be the double of what it may be, they ought not to repine, but undergo it with chearfulness, since they have brought it all upon

upon themselves; in short, if they would preserve their possessions, they have no other alternative, but either to erect a sufficient number of forts, or go to war. If this method succeeds, it will not only be much better than a war, which is attended with numerous hazards and calamities, but we shall be great gainers by it, since we shall save the expence of a war, whereas an expensive war, altho' successful, would not save us this expence. For forts would then be as necessary to preserve the colonies, as they are now. It will signify nothing to drive the *French* out of a country, if we do not secure it; for, as they never give up the thoughts of what they have once possessed, they will certainly return to it whenever they find an opportunity. Witness their frequent returns into *Nova Scotia*, as often as they have been forced out. That method then is most eligible, which would save us one of those expences. However, we had better be at both, than lose such valuable colonies, which are the principal fund of wealth to *England*.

After all, the expence will not be so very great as may at first sight be imagined. I have been informed by gentlemen, knowing in these matters, that such forts might be built at the rate of a thousand pounds each, one with another. So that supposing their number amounted to 30 or even 40, what is that expence to put the colonies in a good posture of defence? But perhaps, at present, or at first, it may be sufficient to secure the northern borders of our colonies, from the mouth of the river *Obio* to the head of the *Kennebek*, and then about nine forts might do; two on the *Obio*, one at its mouth in the *Mississippi*, and the other at the mouth of the *Wabash*: a third higher-up on the *Wabash*, a fourth at *Niawgre*, a

fifth at *Crown Point*, and a sixth at the head of the *Kennibek*; a seventh at the mouth of *St. John's* river, and an eighth at *Shegnikto*: to these let us add a ninth in the country of the *Charokees*. Thus for about 10 or 11,000 pounds, allowing the surplus towards building some stronger than ordinary, may the colonies be tolerably well defended with forts against any attempts of the *French* to hinder them from completing their design of gradually fortifying their frontiers effectually: which ought to be done as soon as possible, beginning at the same time at the two extremities of the *Northern* line, where the strongest forts of all ought to be built, under the protection of strong bodies of forces.

To support what has been advanced concerning the expence of building forts, I shall cite the words of an *American* gentleman well versed in the affairs of the colonies, in a letter written a few years ago to his friend in *London*. "The charge, says he, of building forts necessary for the above purposes, if estimated by the expence and size of those of *Europe*, or those on the sea-coasts of the principal towns in *America*, which may be attacked by ships and cannon, may make these proposals seem impracticable. Therefore, it may be proper to shew what the forts already built there cost the *English* and *French*, with how many men they are usually garrisoned, from which their maintenance may be computed; and that such have generally been sufficient for the intention. In 1734, *New York* built a fort at *Skenéetadi*, with eight pieces of small cannon, well contrived for defence against small arms (the only weapons *Indians* can have) and capable of containing above 200 men, which cost less than one thou-

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" sand pounds. The year after, another of the  
 " same model and size was built among the *Ma-*  
 " *quas* [or *Mobawak*] *Indians* for as small a sum:  
 " That at *Oswégo*, by reason of the distance, cost  
 " a trifle more. *Fort Moor*, in *South Carolina*,  
 " and *Fort Augusta* in *Georgia*, by no just means  
 " could exceed either of the other, as they are  
 " not so well built, and are worse planned. The  
 " *French* forts at *Niawgra*, *Detroit* and *Alba-*  
 " *bamy*, are much like them; and the number  
 " of private men of both nations, in each of these  
 " garrisons, are nearly equal, from 20 to 30.  
 " But the *French* always have most officers.  
 " *Crown Point*, as it is designed for a perpetual  
 " barrier between the *English* and *French*, as well  
 " as to cover *Canada* and *Mont Real* from inva-  
 " sions which may be attempted on that side, is  
 " stronger, and built in a different manner."

What number of forces may be necessary on  
 this occasion, I will not pretend to prescribe: But  
 whatever it may be, they ought to be furnished all  
 at once for carrying on the work in different parts  
 at the same time, and preventing any attempt of  
 our bad neighbours (for we must not call them  
 enemies yet) in one place, while we are employed  
 in strengthening another. We should have regu-  
 lar forces in the country much superior to those  
 of the *French*, that in case of a loss on our side, or  
 recruits on theirs, our people may be quickly  
 reinforced and supported. The colonies them-  
 selves will, no doubt, cheerfully furnish the greater  
 part of these forces, especially if they be officered  
 by their own people; a measure the more proper,  
 as it would prevent misunderstandings (always  
 fatal to military expeditions) which might happen  
 to arise between officers and troops of different  
 countries: for soldiers will more readily obey

their natural commanders; and this regard shewn, the latter will make them more zealous to repulse the *French*, against whom they are highly exasperated. They are likewise better acquainted with the situation of the country, as well as with the disposition of their people, and with the manner of proceeding against their enemies of both kinds.

In these preparations the utmost diligence is absolutely necessary, considering what alarming accounts arrive every day of the distressed condition of the colonies, their apprehensions of the *French*, who are drawing out forces on every side, and of the little which hath been yet done, or preparations made to oppose them: something therefore ought to be undertaken this winter, to give a check to their proceedings, whether it be by building two or three forts of our own, or demolishing so many of theirs. For, considering the enterprizing spirit and indefatigable diligence of those people (which deserve both our praise and imitation) if nothing can be done till next summer, as some would pretend, it will give the *French*, who are already very strong, leisure enough to fortify themselves so effectually, that it may require at least five times the force and expence which it would at present, whether we only proceed to fortify our colonies, or are obliged to enter into an open war.

## IV.

*The defenceless condition of the colonies, to what owing.*

**S**UCH measures closely pursued and well executed, will, doubtless, procure a temporary relief: But, in order to make the security effectual and lasting, two things must be antecedently done.

The first is to bring about a union of the colonies among themselves, for their mutual support. And happily at last, the danger which now threatens them has opened their eyes, and disposed them to unite: so that this intrusion of their neighbours, whatever it may cost them, in case they can get over it, will, in the end, prove a blessing instead of a curse.

On this occasion I cannot forbear observing, that the consternation which the present bold invasion of the *French* into the country of the *Ohio*, has thrown the colonies into, ought to be a perpetual warning to them how they act for the future; since they must now be convinced that by neglecting the proper means of uniting for their mutual defence, and fortifying their out-settlements, as well as frontiers, they may be reduced at length to the necessity of submitting to either a foreign or a domestic yoke.

A state may be ruined by the ill conduct of either the people or their governors: which must be the case, when one party, led by corrupt principles, and regardless of the admonitions or discontents of the other, act wholly in conformity to their own selfish or rapacious views, and obstinately refuse to do what is necessary for the good

of the whole. It is thus that governments are overturned or nations enslaved.

A union of the colonies has been recommended by none more zealously than the *American* gentlemen themselves, who have wished their welfare. Without one, they never can be secure from such incompatible neighbours as the *French*; and 'tis chiefly to the want of this union that they owe their present calamitous situation: for, being in a state of separation, and each acting solely for its own interest, without regard to the welfare or safety of the rest; this naturally begat jealousies, envyings, animosities, and even a disposition to do one another mischief rather than good. Thus at variance, as it were, like enemies among themselves, one province beheld, without concern, a neighbour province attacked and ravaged by the enemy, and refused lending any aid of either men or money, under pretence, that the danger did not affect them; that the other provinces had more trade than theirs; and that every province ought to take care of itself.

Some of the provinces immediately dependent on the crown have refused to assist the charter governments, which has given those colonies a kind of antipathy, and made them averse to assist such bad relations. *New York* especially has been guilty of this unneighbourly and unnatural part.

“ *New York*, says Mr. *Dummer*, in his representation, has always kept itself in a state of neutrality, contributing nothing to the common safety of the *British* colonies; while the *Canada* Indians joined by parties of the *French*, used to make their rout by the borders of *New York*, without any molestation from the *English* of that province, and fall upon the out-towns of

“ *New*

" *New England.* This behaviour was the more  
 " unpardonable in that government, because they  
 " have 400 regular troops maintained among  
 " them, at the King's charge, and have five na-  
 " tions of the *Troquois* on their confines, who  
 " are entirely dependent on them; and might  
 " easily, had they been engaged in the common  
 " cause, have intercepted the *French* in their  
 " marches, and thereby prevented the depreda-  
 " tions on his majesty's subjects of *New England*.  
 " Solemn and repeated applications were made  
 " to the government of *New York*, by the go-  
 " vernors of the *Massachusetts*, *Connecticut*, and  
 " *Rhode Island*, in their letters on this subject,  
 " but in vain: the answer was, *They could not*  
 " *think it proper to engage their Indians in actual*  
 " *war, lest they should endanger their own fron-*  
 " *tiers, and bring on themselves an expence which*  
 " *they were in no condition to provide for.*"

However, this sacrificing of their brethren did  
 not save themselves; for the *French*, after they  
 had done harrassing the borders of *New England*,  
 and destroying many of the inhabitants, then fell  
 on *New York*; and that government which re-  
 fused to succour their neighbours, for fear of pro-  
 voking the *French*, as they pretended, by no less  
 bad a step, proceeding from the same real cause,  
 which was covetousness, brought that very evil  
 on the province which they seemed so careful to  
 avoid: for by suffering the *French* to build the  
 fort at *Crown-Point*, within their frontiers, in  
 1731, as hath been mentioned, they in effect  
 gave up their chief security on that side into their  
 hands. This they experienced to their cost three  
 years after: when being sensibly alarmed with  
 the motions of the *French* and *Indians* on their  
 frontiers, they found themselves obliged to be

at near 12,000 pounds charge at once, to provide towards their defence; which they might have saved by only laying out a few hundreds to prevent the enemy from falling on *New England*, and building that dangerous fort. Ever since which time they have been under the greatest apprehensions; and none cry out louder now for aid from their neighbours, than they who so lately refused to lend them any. A just punishment which is always the consequence of acting against the established maxims of obligation and safety.

That same selfish spirit which induced them to disregard their brethern, at length so far possessed them as to make them forget themselves, and not only neglect to secure their respective frontiers, but even to suffer the *French* to build forts in those very places where they ought to have erected them for their own security. So that it may be in a manner said that all the encroachments which they now complain of were made with their own consent.

But I cannot better set forth the pernicious effects of this disunion than in the words of the Gentleman quoted before, to his friend in *London*, a few years ago. "The *British* colonies are without union, are disconcerted, are jealous of each other, and act on different principles as well as interests. Some colonies have borne the burdens of all wars, whilst others have had peace and protection without expence; some have even grown rich by supplying the enemies of its neighbour in actual war. Very few colonies know their own bounds. In 1731 *New England* and *New York*, for that reason, tamely saw *Crown-Point* fortified, the consequence of which has very lately been felt. In 1726 *New York* and *Pennsylvania* permitted *Niawgra* to be possessed



“ felled and garrisoned, and very probably will  
 “ suffer *Tierondoquot* to undergo the same fate,  
 “ as it is not known to which province it be-  
 “ longs.”

That the colonies have contributed much to their present unhappy situation, is a fact acknowledged by all the *American* writers I have met with who treat on this subject. They charge them with jealousies and animosities on account of trade and private interest, and alledge that these selfish views enter into their assemblies, and prevent the public welfare; with not assisting one another, when attacked; with suffering the *French* to encroach on each other, and build forts without any opposition; with taking no care of the public security, and even neglecting to secure their frontiers, tho’ earnestly recommended to them by the King. This occasioned Mr. *Kennedy* to say, “ I cannot help thinking, from upwards  
 “ of forty years observations upon the conduct  
 “ of our colony assemblies, and the little regard  
 “ paid by them to instructions, that if it be left  
 “ altogether to them, the whole will end in al-  
 “ tercation and words.”

The colonies have, in reality, in many cases, acted as if they thought themselves so many independent states, under their respective charters, rather than as provinces of the same empire: which consideration necessarily requires a union of the parts, for security of the whole. And without doubt, in case they will not unite of their own accord, it is in the power of the *British* parliament to unite or incorporate them in such a manner as may appear most conducive to the welfare of the colonies in general, consistent with the privileges and immunities which they enjoy from the royal grants.

Indeed

Indeed this disunion among the provinces has been kept up in good measure by a pernicious maxim, which in some former reigns prevailed in their mother country, like that which seems to prevail there still, of ruling by parties, or division. The bad effects of which may be seen in the present distressed and distempered state of the colonies, by which the maxim *divide et impera*, appears to have operated more for the interest of the *French* than of *Great Britain*: former governments might likewise have had another pretence for keeping up this disunion among the colonies, namely, the danger, in an united state, of their throwing off dependence and setting up for themselves. But this can never reasonably be supposed to happen, were they ever so rich, as well as strongly united, unless they were driven to that extremity, by usage which would make *Britons* themselves impatient of subjection. However, to suppose any such danger at present, or for many ages to come, is ridiculous; since they can never do any thing while they want a fleet, and *Britain* has one to restrain them. So long as this shall be the case, if ever they should revolt, it would never be with design to set up for themselves: they would be under a necessity to seek the protection of some other power. A step which would be much more pernicious to *Britain* than barely shaking off their dependency, as there could be no hopes of their recovery. And whereas in one case she might still be supplied from them, with their produce of sugars, timber, naval stores, and other commodities; in the other case she would be intirely deprived of those rich branches of commerce, and both their wealth and power would be turned against her.

The

The colonies from some hard usage, received in former times, had entertained an opinion that *Britain* was resolved to keep them low, and regardless of their welfare. They seemed confirmed in this opinion by nothing more than the governors and other officers sent among them.

In reading the history of *American* affairs, one would imagine, that at certain times the administration here had entered into a conspiracy by that method, either to ruin the colonies, or give them up to *France*: for they employed needy persons, generally without either principles or abilities; who, studious only to make the most of their time, minded nothing but how to fill their purses: too often intent likewise on enriching themselves by trade, they have not only neglected the affairs of the plantations, but have encouraged measures prejudicial to the colonies, and therefore misled the government here by false representations of their condition. This was the case of colonel *Moor*, governor of *Carolina*, at the beginning of the present century, who had formed a design to engross the whole trade of that province to himself, by a bill drawn up for that purpose. On being disappointed of his aim, he set on foot other measures, which occasioned many troubles; and these were continued by the subsequent governors, till, on the people's petition, the charter was vacated, and the government resumed by the crown. Indeed from trading governors a genuine representation of colony-affairs is never to be expected. This was the colonel *Moor*, who, on appearance of two small frigates off at sea, made a precipitate retreat from before the castle of *St. Augustin*, which he had besieged; leaving all his transports, with a great quantity of stores, ammunition and provisions, to the enemy

my. On this occasion it is worth observing, that the *Indian* chief retired with the rest to his *Periwaga*, and slept on his oars, with much unconcern. The governor's soldiers uneasy to be gone, desired him to make haste away : but he replied " No : altho' your governor leaves you, " I will not stir till I have seen all my men before me." What more noble could the greatest general of *Greece* or *Rome* have said ? Several of these governors, by their arbitrary proceedings and rapine, have almost ruined the colonies which they were set over : some have so provoked the people as to oblige them to seize their persons and send them over hither ; others have been recalled and prosecuted : but rarely the sufferers reaped any advantage from such prosecutions ; or any of the offenders were made examples of, as they ought to have been, in terror to others.

There have been, 'tis true, bad charter as well as crown governors ; of which first kind was *Moor* above-mentioned. But altho' their actions were much alike, there was a vast difference as to the consequence ; since the colonies were generally punished for the faults of their own governors : but it does not appear that they had any amends made them for the violences and oppressions committed by those sent from hence.

The welfare or ruin of provinces almost entirely depends on the choice of governors who are sent. Mr. *Colden* speaking of the weak and deceitful counsels which prevailed in the northern colonies, about the year 1690, and which had brought the five nations almost to destruction, and saved *Canada* from it, expresseth himself thus :  
 " We shall see by the sequel how a public spirit,  
 " directed by wise counsels, can overcome all  
 " difficulties, while a selfish spirit loses all, even  
 " natural

“ natural advantages. In the present case the  
 “ turn which affairs took seems to have been en-  
 “ tirely owing to one thing. The *French* in  
 “ making the Count *de Frontenac* governor of  
 “ *Canada*, chose the man every way the best  
 “ qualified for this service: the *English* seemed  
 “ to have had little regard to the qualifications  
 “ of the person they sent, but to gratify a rela-  
 “ tion or a friend, by giving him an opportunity  
 “ to make a fortune: and as he knew that he  
 “ was recommended with this view, his counsels  
 “ were chiefly employed for this purpose \*.”

Elsewhere † speaking of the divisions and dis-  
 orders which reigned in *New York* on the revolu-  
 tion, says, “ that some imputed all the misfor-  
 “ tunes to the want of care in the choice of go-  
 “ vernors; and that the ministry had the saving  
 “ of money chiefly in view, when to gratify some  
 “ small services they gave employments in *Ame-*  
 “ *rica* to those who were not capable of much  
 “ meaner offices at home.”

The abject state of the colonies in those times,  
 with respect to governors, was so glaring, that  
 the *French* themselves took notice of it. *Char-*  
*levoix* speaking ‡ of the three faults which he ob-  
 served in the *British* colonies, two whereof have  
 been already mentioned, says the greatest of them  
 was “ the bad choice commonly made of those  
 “ to whom the command either of particular  
 “ posts, or intire provinces, was intrusted. These,  
 “ continues he, were almost constantly men in-  
 “ tent on making a fortune, who knew nothing  
 “ of war, nor had ever so much as seen a battle;  
 “ and whose whole merit consisted in having pro-

\* Hist. of the Five Nations, p. 120.

† P. 94.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 197.

“ cured riches by ways incompatible with the  
 “ qualifications necessary to support the ranks to  
 “ which they were advanced ; and which such  
 “ kinds of persons never do acquire.”

It is to this evil conduct, which in those times was pursued by the government here, that Mr. *Colden* ascribes the jealousies and misunderstandings which have happened between the people and their governors, if such men deserve the name ; for he goes on, “ By this means an *English* governor generally wants the esteem of the  
 “ people. While they think that a governor has  
 “ not the good of the people in view, but his  
 “ own, they on all occasions are jealous of him :  
 “ so that even a good governor with more difficulty pursues generous purposes and public  
 “ benefits : because the people suspect them to  
 “ be mere pretences to cover a private design.  
 “ It is for this reason that any man opposing a  
 “ governor, is sure to meet with the favor of  
 “ the people, almost in every case. On the other  
 “ hand, the opinion which the *French* had of the  
 “ Count *de Frontenac's* public spirit, and of his  
 “ wisdom and diligence, made them enter into  
 “ all his measures without hesitating, and cheer-  
 “ fully obey all his commands \*.”

The people of the colonies, finding themselves oppressed by their governor, who acted as if they thought the provinces were delivered into their hands not to take care of, but to plunder and ruin, complained to their mother country ; and their mother country neither regarded their complaints nor redressed their grievances. Want of care in the parents begat want of care in the children : and this was the rise of the present disorder

\* Ibid.



ders in the colonies, which by degrees have reduced them to such a weak condition, that it has not been in the power of the governors, of late years, with all their abilities and endeavours, to restore them.

However, this desirable work may, in a little time more, be effected, provided *Britain* continues to send over men of condition and integrity, capable of applying remedies to the evil, and zealous for the welfare of the colonies. It could be wished also, to prevent any difference which might happen between the colonies and their governors about their salaries, that the government here would take the payment on themselves. A fund sufficient to defray this and several other expences relating to the plantations, might be raised, we are told, by only laying a halfpenny per gallon duty on the molasses and rum imported into the northern colonies.

There ought to subsist a perfect harmony between *Great Britain* and them. They both ought to think their interests to be the same, as they really are : and on that right principle *Great Britain* ought not only to strengthen and support them to the utmost, but encourage and promote their commerce, in as extensive a manner as she does her own. A good mother seldom fails to have good children. The inhabitants of the colonies do not think themselves aliens, or the less a-kin to those of *Great Britain*, because separated by a vast ocean, and dwelling in a distant part of the globe : they insist that they are branches of the same *British* tree, tho' transplanted in a different soil ; that they have not forfeited their *British* rights by that removal, because they removed with consent of the government, and sincerely acknowledge themselves to be subjects of the same

King :

King : That they daily extend the power and dominion of *Great Britain*, by extending their settlements and commerce ; so that in supporting them *Great Britain* in effect supports itself, and adds to its own wealth : ' That their industry is employ'd not more for their own than their brethren's advantage, who are enriched by their labour and the valuable produce of their several colonies : that for this reason, they think themselves intitled both to their love and assistance, which it is no less their interest than it is their duty, as brethren, to afford them : that in short, they speak the same language, and are of the same religion with them ; so that they ought not to be thought presumptuous, if they consider themselves upon an equal footing with us, or treated the worse, because they will be *Englishmen*.

From what has been said, I think it appears evident, that for security of the colonies, a general union is absolutely necessary ; and the rather, as in all emergencies or cases of danger like the present, the utmost unanimity and dispatch is requisite ; which yet, from the constitutions of some of the colonies, is not always to be hoped for.

Of all the colonies on the continent, there are only the *Virginia*, *New York*, *New Hampshire*, *Carolinas*, and *Nova Scotia*, the property and government of which are in the crown. The constitutions of the rest are of a mixt kind. In some, the government and jurisdiction only are in the crown, and the property in particular persons, proprietors, or the people ; in others, both government and property are in the people : lastly, in some, both government and property are vested in private persons.

Out

Out of the provinces, therefore, the crown may be said to have authority in only five or six on the continent, to raise money, and levy men for their defence. 'Tis true, those colonies where the people have the property, will naturally be induced to defend themselves when attacked, 'or in danger, because the land is their own : But then as they can't be compelled to do this in the present state of disunion, if they should be affected with the selfish contagion, which has prevailed in some colonies, they would help none but themselves. On the other hand, the proprietary colonies are not likely to help either their neighbours or themselves ; for the proprietor or proprietors coveting, perhaps, to make the most they can of their lands, pocket all the quit-rents, without expending any thing considerable for the defence of the country ; and, when war comes, leave the people in the lurch : either thro' unwillingness to part with what they had been hoarding for many years, or their not being able to assist them, having squandered in high living, what they ought to have laid up against such emergencies.

This was the case with many of the proprietors of *Carolina*, who, in the war which the *Spanish Indians* made on that colony, about 1718, to revenge the frauds committed by the traders, were not able to assist the people. This obliged them to have recourse for succour to the other colonies ; which not being sufficient for the purpose, they applied to the government here to take them under their protection. This, joined to the arbitrary proceedings of the governors for near 20 years before, gave so great offence to the King and council, that in vacating the *Carolina* charter, with respect to all the proprietors, excepting one, they were on the point of resuming all the *American* charters. This recent example, methinks,

ought to be a warning to the colonies, not to omit doing what is reasonable and necessary for defence of themselves, and indeed of one another.

The people of *Carolina* had certainly a just and lawful pretence for what they did: for, since the proprietors did not defend them, (whether thro' disability or covetousness it mattered not) as they were obliged to do by their charter, they had no right to jurisdiction or authority over either the country or the inhabitants; both which were forfeited to the crown, from whom they received their conditional grant.

Whether all the other colonies have the same demand on the crown for their defence, which the people of *Carolina*, (since then divided into two provinces) had on their proprietaries, I will not undertake to determine. They say, indeed, that they ought to be considered as the "liege people of the crown of *England*, and to have right to all liberties, franchises, and privileges of *Englishmen*, as if they were born within the kingdom of *England*," in the same manner as the people of *Carolina* were declared to be, and have, by their charter; and that since they pay taxes and duties, as other subjects of *England* do, they ought to be intitled to the defence of the government as much as the people of *England*, and to be at no farther expence on that occasion.

This is a very delicate point, and requires to be touched with great caution: I shall, therefore, content myself with citing the opinion of a certain author on the like occasion, who made it his business to enquire into the affairs of the colonies. "We cannot help taking notice, saith he, that in every one of the governors speeches there are great complaints of the bad state of their fortifications; and as these complaints have  
" long

“ long continued, and yet remain without redress,  
 “ it really seems high time to put those affairs  
 “ upon some different footing: for this nation  
 “ reaps too great a benefit from our colonies in  
 “ the *West Indies* [*America*] to be quite uncon-  
 “ cerned, whether or no they keep themselves in  
 “ a proper state of defence. If the people of our  
 “ respective colonies can bear taxes, and will  
 “ not tax themselves in a proper state for so ne-  
 “ cessary a purpose, the legislative authority of  
 “ *Great Britain* might interpose: And if they  
 “ already pay as many taxes as they are able to  
 “ bear, which are all appropriated to other *more*  
 “ *necessary* purposes, if any *more necessary* can be,  
 “ this nation ought to assist them: But it looks a  
 “ little odd, continues the same writer, that while  
 “ our governors are most of them reaping their  
 “ annual thousands, their respective governments  
 “ should remain without the necessary fortifica-  
 “ tions for scores of years.”

Altho’ on considering the premises, I can’t see  
 how the colonies can be secure, or long subsist,  
 without a union among themselves; yet the same  
 principles which render a coalition absolutely ne-  
 cessary, must render it also very difficult to be ob-  
 tained. For individuals have been always found  
 very backward to give up any thing for the good  
 of the whole; and this is the very age of reten-  
 tion, in which every man’s benevolence is center-  
 ed in himself, and publick spirit is absorbed by  
 private interest: so that this affair could not have  
 happened, perhaps, at a more unlucky time. How-  
 ever, in case a union of the colonies cannot be  
 brought about at all, or is not likely to take  
 place quickly; yet, if the rule proposed in the  
 above quotation be deemed a proper one, the  
 whole *American* dominions may be effectually se-

cured against the *French*, notwithstanding the unwillingness of any part to contribute towards the defence of the whole.

As the opinions of judicious persons, on this intricate, as well as important, point, cannot be unacceptable, I shall insert another method proposed by a gentleman already quoted, who is very well versed in the affairs of the colonies. "Every *English* colony, says he, in the present disconcerted state, on the least danger, seeks assistance from its mother country, and encreases her burthen, tho' already oppressed. Some colonies are rich, but scanty of white inhabitants: some abound in wealthy people and a superfluity of every thing. Others, tho' populous, are poor, scarce of provisions, and for a century have been severely harrassed by wars with the *French* and *Indians*. All of them have acted separately and unconnectedly, as tho' they were not members of one body but different nations. May it not, therefore, be worthy of *Britain* and a *British* parliament, to consider how these colonies may defend one another, and support the *British* interest in *America*? Would they not in a very short time be able so to do, if the legislature of *Britain* (no less power can do it) should oblige each colony, in proportion to its ability, yearly to raise and lay by a proper sum of money as a common fund; solely applicable to the defence of any colony attacked by *French* or *Indians*, and to the building small advanced forts in all proper places, every where to secure the new out-settlements, and encrease the *Indian* trade (such as that at *Oswégo* before-mentioned) since the *English* can always supply the *Indians* better and cheaper than the *French*. By doing this, and by bestowing half  
" the



“ the presents now given, in a proper manner  
 “ and place, should we not abridge and separate  
 “ the vast extensive claim which the *French* pre-  
 “ tend to, by comprehending all the inland  
 “ parts of *North America*. under the names of  
 “ *Canada* and *Louisiana* ? Would not both *French*  
 “ and *Indians* be deterred and awed into a pro-  
 “ per behaviour, when they found that an injury  
 “ done to one colony would be repented by all  
 “ the rest ? Would not this be performed with-  
 “ out the least present expence to *Britain*, lessen  
 “ what she is now at, finally take off the whole,  
 “ and much encrease her future trade and wealth ?  
 “ All proportions, and every thing necessary may  
 “ be easily calculated and adjusted, when such a  
 “ scheme is approved and carried into execution.”

Mr. *Kennedy* asks, why cannot the *British* co-  
 lonies unite as well as the the five nations ? the  
 answer is easy : because their way of living is not  
 so simple, their condition so equal, and their pur-  
 suits, as well as plan, of happiness confined to so  
 few things. Their mother country was in the same  
 disunited state in the time of *Cæsar* : But it ought  
 to be remembered, that disunion was her ruin ;  
 and that they ought to be warned by so home an  
 example.

## V.

*The necessity of using Indians in war, and of gaining  
 their friendship.*

**T**HE next preliminary point to be effected, is  
 to secure the *Indians* in our interest ; on ac-  
 count, as well of recovering and extending our  
 trade, as of securing our colonies against the at-  
 tack either of *French* or *Indians*.

Their way of making war and fighting is quite different from the *European*. They do not draw into the open field but shoot from behind trees ; and are exceeding dextrous both at hitting their mark and sheltering themselves from the enemies fire or pursuit : for, there is no room for horse in countries overgrown with woods, which gave occasion to this way of fighting ; and there is no overtaking them on foot they run so swiftly.

Therefore, in case of any war, either with *Indians* alone, or where they are auxiliaries, we must have *Indians* to oppose *Indians*. They must be fought with their own way. Regular forces being wholly unacquainted with their way of making war can be of no service against them : they are only of use to defend a fort, or to support *Indian* forces against regular troops. Besides, being used to fire from walls, they scorn to shoot from behind trees ; and would rather die than go out of their own road to practise such a low kind of military art. Not considering that the nature of the country, which is, as it were, one continued wood, requires that way of going to war, and that of all the methods of fighting that is best which is safest.

The *French* of *Canada* know the importance of *Indians* on this account, and therefore never undertake any expedition without them. A memorable deliverance taught them this caution. In 1687 the marquis de *Norville*, governor of *Quebek*, having landed 2100 men at *Tierondoquot*, 300 of them *Indians*, with design to surprize the chief village of the *Sennekas*, whom he intended to destroy ; was surprized himself in the woods, within a mile of the place, by 500 of that nation : who  
starting

starting suddenly from the ground where they had lain flat, raised the war shout, and discharged their musquets. This put his troops into such a consternation, that they began to run on every side ; and in the confusion fired on one another, while the *Sennekas* fell on pell-mell. So that had not the *French Indians*, acquainted with their way of fighting, come up, all must have been destroyed ; and the *French*, very likely, driven out of *Canada*, for the whole force of it was employed in this expedition.

The *French*, since that time, make use of *Indians* more than ever : and since they make use of them, there is still the more reason why we should ; unless we had men enough of our own trained to their manner of making war

Besides ; the advantage of having the *Indians* our friends, may be inferred from the mischiefs they have done ourselves as well as the *French* ; and the danger they have put the colonies in, both from within and without, when our enemies. Altho' the *English*, by dint of numbers, were able to support the wrongs which they did the *Indians*, and either destroyed or subdued them within the colonies ; yet it cost them much blood and labour before they effected it, particularly in *Virginia* and *New England* ; especially this last colony : where made such vigorous efforts at several times, and continued the war with so much obstinacy, even tho' much reduced by them ; that the *English*, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers, were scarce able to withstand them, and but for certain lucky incidents, might have been driven out of all their settlements. Those who left the country, preserve to this day their ancient animosities ; and being joined by the other eastern tribes, continue to harass the borders of the *English*,

and do them all the mischief they can. They are now the more able to take revenge with more safety to themselves ; as, having a large country to retreat in, they cannot be so easily surrounded by the *English*, and oppressed by numbers as they were when inclosed within the colonies, where it would have been better to have kept them by good usage.

Notwithstanding the advantage gained over the *Penobscott Indians*, in the war of 1675 before-mentioned, it was found impracticable to subdue them : for the *English* having neglected to build either towns or forts in the country, the *Indians* could make their incursions into the open lands, and retire again into the woods before the army could come up with them. So that 'tis certain, says Mr. Neal \*, that the *English* were sick of the war, and glad to embrace the first offer of peace, which was concluded the next year, whereby they obliged themselves to allow the *Indians* a certain quantity of corn yearly, as a kind of quit-rent for their lands.

Mr. Neal treats the concession in this article " as not very honourable to the *English* ;" as if there was any difference between taking their lands from them by force, and treating them as slaves, which he blames them for but a few lines before. For my part, I think nothing more honourable than to do justice, or make satisfaction for an injury done.

In 1687, the *English Indians*, to revenge some ill usage, by the instigation of the *French*, invaded the frontiers of *New England*, and commenced a war, which all the powers of the country could not extinguish in ten years †.

I shall

\* p. 26.

† Neal, p. 53.

I shall produce but one instance more to shew what mischief the *Indians* may be able to do us, when our enemies. In the war, carried on about 1718, by the *Spanish Indians* against *Carolina* (the two provinces then being in one) this colony unable to defend itself against them, either by their own force, or that of the other colonies joined with them, were obliged at last to crave assistance from *England*, before they could do any good against them, as hath been mentioned before. Does not this confirm what has been already suggested of the danger the colonies would be in for want of *Indians*, should the *French* at any time invade them with their confederate *Indian* nations? In short, an *Indian* war has always been dreaded, as it has always been fatal to the colonies.

All the colony writers recommend the gaining the *Indian* friendship, as a matter of great importance to them: One of *Carolina* says, that the province is much strengthened by them; and that if trained to fire arms they would be very useful to that province, not only in case of an invasion to repel the enemy, but also by drawing other *Indians* to the *English* interest, or else destroying those who were not to be gained.

It must be confessed, that they are of great use, in either defending or invading a country. They are extremely skilful in the art of surprizing, and watching the motions of an enemy: they always know where to find you; but you never know where to find them: they disperse themselves thro' a country singly, or in very small parties, and lie on the lurch, to pick up stragglers, or procure intelligence: in which they act with an astonishing patience and indefatigableness, beyond any thing which an *European* could undergo; remaining in one place, and often in one posture,  
for

for whole days and weeks together, till they find an opportunity to strike their stroke, or compass their design, whatever it may be.

“ Every *Indian*, says Mr. *Kennedy*,\* is a hunter ;  
 “ and as their manner of making war, by skulk-  
 “ ing, surprizing, and killing particular persons  
 “ and families, is just the same as their hunting,  
 “ only changing the object, every *Indian* is a dis-  
 “ ciplined foldier. *Soldiers of this kind are al-*  
 “ *ways wanted in the colonies in an Indian war* [or  
 “ when *Indians* are employed] *for the European*  
 “ *military discipline is of little use in these woods.*”  
 There is, therefore, an indispensable necessity of making use of *Indians* in our wars, unless we had men enough of our own trained in that sort of military exercise.

The *French*, indeed, have a great number of such people called *Courieurs de Bois*, as expert in the *Indian* way of fighting as the *Indians* themselves, as hath been taken notice of before ; and therefore might be able to do without *Indians*, altho’ they make use of them. But this is an advantage which the colonies have not ; for, altho’ in the southern provinces there may be a good many men, as expert in the *Indian* way of fighting, as the *French Courieurs de Bois*, yet they are under no kind of discipline or command, except those of the considerable *Indian* traders, their masters ; and therefore cannot properly be considered as any publick force or real strength. In the northern colonies *New England* being surrounded with hostile *Indians*, and having still some within itself of the same race, necessity has produced rangers among the inhabitants, without whom there could be no dealing with such enemies. But *New York* depending on the neighbourhood of the five na-

\* In his importance of the *Indians*, p. 43.

tions for its security, and making the *French* their factors with the *Indians*, by selling their goods to them, had few or no rangers at all before that illicit traffic at *Albany* was prohibited, and the trade laid open in 1720 ; since which time the young men being encouraged to go among the *Indians*, the only way of breeding rangers, that province begins to be furnished with them. Altho' rangers are so numerous among the *French*, that they might do without the *Indians*, yet they not only cherish those who live in the country inhabited by themselves, but seek the friendship of all the nations round about them, far and near. On the contrary, the *English* do neither, especially in the northern colonies : for they have not only exterminated all *Indian* nations who formerly dwelt in the countries now possessed by them, but instead of making friends of those who live in the neighbourhood of the colonies, are at variance with them all, excepting the six nations and their allies, whom yet they seem industrious rather to disoblige than keep in their interest ; altho' they have been all along the chief, and to *New York* the only defence against the *French*, and their numerous tribes of *Indians*.

The six nations who dwell at present to the south of the *Kadarakui* or *Ontario* lake, and from lake *Erri* eastward to within a little way of *Albany* in *New York* ; formerly inhabited the country to the south of the river *St. Laurence*, in the parts about *Montreal* and the river *Sorel* or *Rich-lieu*, which issuing out of *Coriear* or *Champlain* lake, falls into the *St. Laurence* river ; and was then, as well as the lake, named after the *Iroquois* : but were forced by the *Adirondaks*, who then inhabited, as they do still, to the north of *St. Laurence* river, to leave their country and fly to the lakes where they now live.

After

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After this, by their good conduct as well as courage, they reduced the *Adirondaks* to a small number, and by degrees conquered the *Quatogbis* or *Hurons*, the *Cbiktagbiks* or *Illinois*, and other nations as far as the river *Meschasebe* or *Mississippi*.

And here, because some people thro' ignorance or self-conceit (I will not say treachery) would represent these six nations, and indeed the *Indians* in general, of no consequence to the colonies; it may be proper, before we proceed to the methods of securing them, to give you the sentiments of some *American* gentlemen, who have much the interest of the plantations at heart, and have written on this subject.

Mr. Colden, in his curious History of the five Nations \*, after mentioning that a number of *Indians* to march with an army which was to attack *Canada*, would be of great use in discovering and defeating the ambushers of the *French Indians*; and that by their incursions into the enemy's country they would terribly harraßs them, and keep them from joining their forces in any great body to oppose the design, he adds, " these  
 " are not the most considerable advantages which  
 " might be gained from the affection of the *Six*  
 " *Nations* at this time, or any time of war. For  
 " if the inland extent of the colonies from *Nova*  
 " *Scotia* to *Georgia* be considered, and at the same  
 " time the numerous *Indian* nations on the con-  
 " tinent of *America*, who may by the artifices of  
 " the *French* be induced to make incursions every  
 " where: if we consider also the cruel methods  
 " by which the *Indians* make incursions in small par-  
 " ties, from the vast forest which everywhere covers  
 " the *Continent*, and which in many places is im-

\* P. 193.

" penetrable ;

“penetrable; it must evidently appear, that al-  
 “tho’ the *English* colonies be of much superior  
 “force in numbers of men, yet their number  
 “would not be sufficient to protect their fron-  
 “tiers from the incursions of the *Indians* in every  
 “place; and, that while their forces must in this  
 “case be divided and scattered all over their  
 “frontiers, it may be in the power of the *French*  
 “in *Canada*, to invade, with success, any part  
 “of the *English* colonies. On the other hand,  
 “if a proper attempt were to be made by the  
 “northern colonies alone, without the assistance  
 “of their mother country, but with the assist-  
 “ance of the *Indians*, it would, in all appear-  
 “ance, be sufficient to reduce *Canada*: but if  
 “the *Indian* nations can be persuaded to join  
 “heartily (as from what is above related seems  
 “probable they may) it will be impossible for the  
 “inhabitants of *Canada* to defend themselves from  
 “the incursions of these numerous *Indian* nations,  
 “and from a body of regular troops at the same  
 “time. As the *French* are very sensible of these  
 “advantages to be gained from the friendship of  
 “the *Indian* nations, they neglect no means in  
 “their power to procure them; and it is to be  
 “hoped that the northern colonies will be no less  
 “assiduous in a matter on which their well-being,  
 “at least, depends.”

The six nations border on the provinces of  
*New York* and *Pensylvania*, to which they are a  
 very strong defence. “Their dependants and  
 “confederates, says another *American* writer, lie  
 “near the *French* settlements; some in the midst  
 “of, and some beyond them. The wisdom of  
 “the chiefs, in these united cantons, has gained  
 “them no less reputation than their courage;  
 “which indeed has struck terror into the re-  
 “most

“most

trable;



“ and that *manly fortitude*, which is the constant  
 “ companion of integrity. The friendship of a  
 “ nation like this, tho’ under the appellation of  
 “ savages or barbarians, is an honour to the most  
 “ civilized people. I say nothing of the advan-  
 “ tage which is derived from commerce with  
 “ them : and the *French* well know, by dear ex-  
 “ perience, how terrible they are to their enemies  
 “ in war.”

“ When we speak of the five nations in *France*,  
 “ (says *La Potherie* in his history of north *Ame-*  
 “ *rica*) they are thought, by common mistake,  
 “ to be mere barbarians, always thirsting after  
 “ human blood : but their true character is very  
 “ different. They are the fiercest and most for-  
 “ midable people in all north *America* : at the  
 “ same time as *politic* and *judicious* as well can  
 “ be imagined. This appears from the manage-  
 “ ment of the affairs which they transact, not  
 “ only with the *French* and *English*, but likewise  
 “ with almost all the *Indians* of this vast *Conti-*  
 “ *nent*.”

This testimony in their favour is the more to  
 be regarded, as it comes from a *Frenchman*, whose  
 nation in *Canada* have suffered greatly from time  
 to time, once almost to extirpation, by the incur-  
 sions and slaughters made by those brave people  
 in the year 1688, as hath been already mentioned.  
 As to the custom which they have in common  
 with a few other nations, of burning their pri-  
 soners who are not adopted by them, it ought  
 to be considered as done by way of retaliation,  
 rather than from a principle of revenge or blood-  
 thirstiness ; from which last Mr. *Potherie* has ac-  
 quitted them.

The consequence of these expeditions was, that  
 the *French* were obliged to burn their two barks

on

on the *Kadarakui* lake, and abandon their fort there; that almost all the *Indian* nations, excepting two, deserted their interest and made peace with the *five nations*: that they lost several thousands of their inhabitants by the continual incursions of small parties; and that the remainder not daring to plant, sow, or even go from one town to another, for fear of being scalped, a famine ensued, which had like to have put a miserable end to that colony. What must have become of *Canada* at this time, if only *New York* had performed her engagements to the *five nations*?

The *five nations* would have pursued their blow and quite extirpated the *French*, when the governor of *New York* stopt them from going on: for which that province severely smarted soon after; for in *February* 1690, the *French* with their *Indians* surprised *Skenéktadi*, near *Albany*, burnt the town, murdered 63 persons in cold blood, and carried away 27 prisoners. This war was begun by the *French*, with a design to destroy the *five nations* (as they were then) and lasted till the peace of *Reswyk* in 1698, during which time the people of *Canada* were in the dreadful circumstances we have just now related.

This noble stand and success against the *French* and their *Indians* is the more remarkable, as the *five nations* were then divided in their sentiments and measures: three of the *five*, the *Onondawgas*, *Kayugaws* and *Oneyots*, by the influence of *Jesuits*, were diverted from prosecuting the war against *Canada*, and turned their arms against the *Virginia Indians*; the *Sennekas* had a war at the same time on their hands with three numerous nations, the *Utawawas*, the *Chiktagbiks* or *Illinois*, and the *Twigtwis* or *Miyamis* \*. Since then the

\* *Golden's Hist.* p. 90 and seq.

*French* have made several attempts to destroy or subdue them, by various methods. *La Hontan* says, that he proposed a scheme to *Lewis XIV.* "for building forts on the lakes of *Canada*, "which would force the *Jorquise*, [or the five "nations] either to abandon their country or "submit to the *French*, who would then, as he "told the King, with their other *Indian* allies, "be able to beat the *English* out of all their "plantations." But this scheme was never tried ; and if practicable, might not the *English*, by building forts, be able, with the assistance of the five nations, to drive the *French* out of *Canada* ?

The six nations, from a small beginning, have made themselves formidable likewise throughout the *Indians* of all north *America*. By their victories and conquests northwards, they subdued the *Adirondaks*, by the *French* called *Algonkins*, the most powerful nation of all, when the *French* settled in *Canada* in 1603 ; together with their allies the *Utawawas* or *Dewagunbas*, the *Quatogbis*, by the *French* *Hurons*, and the *Nipeferins*, not much inferior in power to the *Adirondaks*. Then turning their arms south westward, they conquered the *Sattanas* or *Showanons*, who dwelt in the country now possessed by the five nations ; the *Cbiktagbiks* or *Illinois*, as far as the river *Mississippi* ; and would have subdued the *Twigtwis* or *Miyamis*, the most powerful nation at present in the *Ohio* country (great numbers of whom they destroyed) if they had not been diverted by an invasion of the *French*. In short, they brought the *Indians* under their subjection as far as south *Carolina* ; extending their dominion over a vast country above 1200 miles in length from north to south, and 7 or 800 in breadth from east to west.

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*French*

In short, these people are considered by the judicious *Americans*, both *English* and *French*, as equal, if not superior to either the antient *Greeks* or *Romans*, for generosity, integrity, justice, policy in government, firmness of mind and courage; particularly intrepidity and contempt of death, in which their behaviour, and singing their death song, in the midst of the most exquisite torments inflicted by their enemies when taken prisoners in war, shews them to surpass all mankind besides.

However, the generality of our vain unthinking countrymen, for want of the *Indian* understanding, look on them as a despicable people, because they are content with poverty, and do not make a figure like other nations, things for which they more justly hold the *Europeans* in contempt: for they rightly place the happiness and dignity of man, in living according to the simplicity of nature, and cultivating political and social virtues; justly concluding from what they observe in the practice of *Europeans*, that riches and parade serve only to make people luxurious, dishonest and effeminate: nor do they scruple to declare the opinion which they have of us, when it comes handsomely in their way. As the *Indians* know how to be even with us in point of contempt, they would doubtless forgive our *American* brethren those airs of superiority, which they place to the account of their vanity and self-conceit, if they would behave to them in other respects consistent with the rules of justice and honour. But their neighbours have given them great cause of offence, chiefly on three occasions; first by drawing them into wars, and then leaving them in the lurch. This was particularly the case during



during all the long war which they had with the *French* from 1687 to 1697.

“ In the year 1690 they were deserted, says  
 “ *Mr. Colden*, by the people of *New York*, after  
 “ they had engaged them in a war against the  
 “ *French of Canada*.” They trified with them  
 again in 1692. At a meeting of the five nations,  
 with colonel *Ingolshy* at *Albany* that year, one of  
 the *Sachems* among other home things said, “ Bro-  
 “ ther *Corlear* (or *New York*) you desire us to  
 “ keep the enemy in perpetual alarm.—Is it not  
 “ to secure your own frontiers, why then not one  
 “ word of your people who are to join us?—  
 “ How comes it that none of our brethren, fast-  
 “ ened in the same chain with us, offer their  
 “ helping hand in this general war, in which our  
 “ great king is engaged against the *French*? Pray  
 “ how come *Maryland*, *Delaware* river, and *New*  
 “ *England*, to be disengaged from this war? How  
 “ comes it that the enemy burns and destroys  
 “ the towns in *New England*, and they make no  
 “ resistance? How comes our great king to  
 “ make war and not to destroy his enemies?  
 “ when if he would only command his subjects  
 “ on this side of the great lake to join, the de-  
 “ struction of the enemy would not make one  
 “ summer’s work.”

However, the five nations being invited to join  
 in the war, readily agreed, and making an in-  
 cursion to the very banks of the river *St. Lau-*  
*rence* between *Montreal* and *Quebek*, put both  
 these places, with the whole country between, in  
 continual alarms. Next year the *French*, to be  
 revenged, surprised three castles of the *Mohawks*;  
 and would have done much greater mischief, if  
 colonel *Fletcher*, then governor of *New York*,  
 had not flown to their assistance. On which oc-

casion they honoured him with the name of *Kay-enguirago*, or the *Great Swift Arrow*. But as they had never received such a blow in the memory of man, they were quite disheartened. " They said " their strength was quite broken, by the continuance of the war: However they added, that " if all the *English* northern colonies would join, " they could still easily take *Canada*; and that " their being so ill armed, was the reason why the " *French* had then escaped. The *French* (continued they) arm their *Indians* compleatly, and " furnish them with every thing necessary for war, " as we find to our cost every time we meet with " them."

In 1694, soon after, the six nations hearing that the *French* had received a considerable force from *France*, began to hearken to some proposals of peace; and being questioned about it by Col. *Fletcher*, told him, the " only reason was the low " condition to which they were reduced, while " none of their neighbours sent them the least " assistance; so that the whole burthen of the " war lay on them alone: that their brethren of " *New England*, *Connecticut*, *Pensylvania*, *Maryland*, and *Virginia*, of their own accord, thrust " their arms into our chain [of peace and alliance:] " but since the war began we have received no " assistance from them. We alone cannot continue the war against the *French*, by reason of " the daily recruits which they receive from " the other side of the great lake\*."

Upon this Col. *Fletcher* gave notice to the above-mentioned provinces of the danger which might arise from such a treaty; and that there was no preventing it but by the *Indians* being assured of more effectual assistance than they had

\* *Colden's Hist.* p. 167.

hitherto

hitherto received. Commissioners from those provinces met at *Albany*, where one of the *Sachems* in his speech after repeating what had been said before to Col. *Fletcher*, added, " Our brother "*Kayenguirago's* arms and ours are stiff, and tired " with holding fast the chain, whilst our neighbours, sit still and smoke at their ease. " The fat is melted from our flesh and fallen on " our neighbours, who grow fat while we grow " lean. They flourish whilst we decay. This chain " made us the envy of the *French* ; and if all " had held it as fast as *Kayenguirago* it would have " been a *terror* also. If we would all heartily " join and take the hatchet in our hand, our common enemy would soon be destroyed, and we " should for ever after live in peace and ease. " *Do you but your parts and thunder itself cannot " break our chain* \*."

This meeting after all came to nothing ; and Col. *Fletcher* not being able to give the five nations any assurances of a vigorous assistance, allowed them to make a separate peace : which, yet in affection to the *English*, they did not. However, in 1695, the *French* re-possessed themselves of *Kadarakui* fort ; which the five nations would have prevented, had 500 men been sent them from *Albany* as they desired.

From this behaviour the five nations began to think that the *English* were lavish of *Indian* lives, and too careful of their own. The *Mohawks*, says Mr. *Colden*, who lived nearest them, having from such behaviour, entertained a mean opinion of their conduct and courage, as well as integrity, were prevailed on by their brethren the *Kabnuaga* or *Praying Indians*, to make peace with Count *Frontenac*, which they did. It was, doubtless,

\* *Colden*, p. 170.

from a reflection on the timid conduct of the *English* in those times, as well as in these, with respect to the *French*, that when lately one of our neighbouring colonies sent to *Onondawga*, the chief town of the six nations, inviting them to send their children thither for education ; they excused themselves, by alledging, that the education would not suit the genius of their youth ; but in return for their good will, sent them word, that *if they would send some of their youth to Onondawga they would teach them to be men.*

These poor faithful *Indians* have the more reason to complain of the *English* on occasion of so many disappointments, as they were terrible sufferers by them : for, altho' they often came off with glory, and always with honour, yet being obliged to maintain the war alone for so many years, not only against the *French* and their confederate *Indians*, but also against several other powerful nations at the same time, as hath been before observed, their strength was greatly weakened ; so that from 10 or 12,000 fighting men, which they were formerly, they are at present reduced to 1000 or 1500 at most : and as the *French* power has encreased while their own declined, they are become much afraid of them, and the more as they think they cannot with certainty depend on the promises or treaties of the *English*.

In a conference which they had not long ago at *Albany*, they declared, " that they were almost brought on their knees to the *French* ; and that unless they were better supported than they had been, they must expect soon to be all cut off ; " Was not such insincerity enough to change their affections and fidelity from the *English* ; who, perhaps, wanted to have them all destroyed, as they almost were in that long and terrible war, from  
the

the same false policy which made them destroy their own *Indians*.

Their next reason for being offended with the *English*, were certain steps taken, which seemed to confirm the jealousy which the *French* were always very industrious to infuse into them; that the *English*, for all their fair pretences, in reality intended to deprive them of their lands, and enslave them. Their first cause of jealousy, on this account, was their being called subjects by the *English*, which at a meeting in 1684 they resented, affirming, that they were not subjects but brethren\*.

Not long after this; King *James*, a little before his abdication, sent over Sir *Edmund Andros* with arbitrary powers; and he, in imitation of the *French*, changed his stile in speaking to the *Indians*, calling them children instead of brethren, the term formerly used. This they complained of at *Albany* in June 1689, and insisted that the old form of treating with them might be restored. They were much more alarmed and irritated a few years after, by the indiscretion of Capt. *Schuyler*, who, after the peace of *Ryswick* in 1697, being sent to *Canada* in behalf of the five nations, by Lord *Ballamont*, then governor of *New York*, in asserting the dependency of the five nations on that province, said, *that these people were their slaves*.

This was so aggravated by the *French*, glad of every opportunity to set the five nations against the *English*, that these *Indians*, more jealous of their liberty than ever were the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*, in 1699 sent their most considerable *Sachems* to *Albany* to complain of it; and at the same time deputies to *Canada* to conclude the peace independently of the *English*: in short, they took

care on all occasions ever since to assert their independency, declaring, that they are born free, and subject to neither the *French* nor *English*.

A third cause of disgust to the *English* has arisen on account of taking their lands from them, which has been the source of many troubles. In 1639, 500 *English* were at one time cut off in *Virginia* by the *Indians*, whose lands they had taken away. The many wars carried on by the *New England Indians* were for the same reason; and tho' driven out of the country, their hatred still subsists. Not many years since quarrels arose about the *Susquebanna* lands; and now lately the grant of the *Ohio* lands gave new discontent: but it is said that all disputes were terminated at *Albany* last July, and that the *Indians* went away perfectly satisfied. However that be, they do not spare to reproach both *French* and *English* "with usurping the lands of so many *Indian* nations, "and chasing them from their own country," as one of their *Sachems* did in a speech made to the governor of *Canada* in 1684.

The last article of complaint concerns trade; in which they always have been, and to this day, are abused in a most scandalous degree. "The "original treaty, or commercial contract, with "the five nations went on tolerably well, says "Mr. *Kennedy*, for some years, till the execution "of it was committed to the care of a number "of commissioners, mostly *Anglo-Dutch* traders "in *Indian* goods; who together with a tribe of "harpies, called *Handlers*, their relations and undertrappers, have so abused, defrauded, and deceived those poor, innocent, well-meaning people, that at present we have very few *Indians* left "who are sincerely in our interest, or who can "be depended on. The fatal consequences of "this

“ this management were severely felt in many instances last war, particularly in the cases of *Saragoga, Skenéktadi, &c.* which could not possibly have happened, had our *Indians* been sincerely our friends.”


The frauds of those handlers are not confined to the common manufactures; they have even the audacity to frustrate the royal bounty, and cheat them of the King's presents. On this occasion Mr. *Kennedy* says, “ I believe I may venture to affirm, that the greater part of the presents made them upon those solemn occasions, seldom go farther than *Albany* or *Skenéktadi*; but are bought up by the *Handlers* for rum, and afterward sold to them when sober at a dear rate.”

The poor *Indians*, it seems, are abused in every thing; for altho' guns are in effect their whole dependence or estate, as well as security, yet it is complained, that those which the *English* sell them are the worst which can possibly be made. This obliges them to go to the *French*, who take care to serve them well, and thus they become attached to them: for they must naturally think, that they who for lucre would impose on them in an article of such importance to both their subsistence and defence, can have no true regard for them.

In the conference with Col. *Ingoldby*, at *Albany*, in 1692, the speaker for the *Indians* tells him, in a sneering way, “ We thank you for the powder and lead given to us: But, what shall we do with them without guns? Shall we throw them at the enemy? We doubt they will not hurt them that way. Before this we always had guns given to us. *It is no wonder that the governor of Canada gains upon us: for he supplies his Indians with guns, as well as powder.* He supplies them plentifully with every thing which can hurt us.”

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At one time there has been powder and lead given to them, but no guns. At another time, tho' pressed to go to war with the *French*, they complained the powder was sold dearer to them than ever, and when they bought their guns they were not fit for service. May I not say, as the *Indians* did themselves, on the occasion, "It is no wonder the governor of *Canada* gains upon them?" It is no less a wonder, methinks, how the governor of *New York* could stand so bitter a reproach.

Commerce ought to be encouraged to the utmost, and be freed from all clogs: but to make it thrive, as well as prevent the *Indians* from deserting us, it will be absolutely necessary to restrain the frauds and licentiousness of traders, under the severest penalties. It is not only in *New York* that they have abused the trade, and lost us the affections of the *Indians* on that side, but they have done the same in *Carolina*: for, altho' that province, which is surrounded with numerous *Indian* nations, had been frequently harrassed by some or other of them; not more by the instigation of the *French* or *Spaniards*, than by the mal-practices of the *English* traders: yet, not warned by experience, or rather not regarding the welfare of the colony, so they gained themselves, which is a maxim with all traders in general, they defrauded and otherwise ill treated the *Spanish Indians*, the most restless of them, all to such a degree, that no longer able to bear it, they broke out into war about the year 1718; and falling by surprize, as usual, on the out-settlements, cut off many *English*, who were unprovided for defence. Thus generally the innocent suffer for the guilty, who escape; and a whole nation for the villainies of a few, who go unpunished.

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The war became so fierce, that *Carolina*, not able to defend itself, called in the assistance of the other colonies: but as even this would not do, and they could obtain no succour from the proprietors; the people addressed the crown to take them under its protection. Forces were sent over who repelled the *Indians*, and the charter being resumed, the King purchased seven eighths of the proprietors, and appointed a governor in 1731.

The six nations would, doubtless, put up with many things which give them cause of disgust; would the colonies but deal honestly by them in their traffick: but it raises their indignation to see that they take all opportunities to trick and impose on them. This gives them strong animosities, as well as distrust. They cannot be prevailed on to believe that the men who cheat them, or those who suffer them to be cheated, in the most vile and scandalous manner, are at all to be confided in, or can possibly be sincerely their friends. The first thing to be done then is to remove their distrust, by wholly altering the present way of treating them, and making some new laws in their favour which may secure them against any future ill usage.

With regard to the injuries they receive from the abuse of trade in particular, the method proposed for redressing them is; to take the management of the *Indian* trade from the people of *Albany*, who are most of them, if not all, traders or handlers, and put it under the direction of some person of capacity and integrity, to be appointed by the King; in the nature of a *superintendent of Indian affairs*, who should be debarred, under severe penalties, from trading either directly or indirectly with the *Indians*: as should likewise the  
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truck-masters or agents, to be annually chosen at the places where the goods are lodged; which goods are to be sold to the *Indians* at a set rate, without any advance thereon; and the *Indians* allowed a market price for their furs. This method is practised in *Canada* by the *French*; and in *New England*, to the great satisfaction of the *Indians* there: and, why should they not be as well dealt with at *New York*, where their good treatment is of far greater importance?

*Tomo Chichi*, when here in 1734; in behalf of the *Creek Indians*, and to prevent for the future their being cheated by the *English* traders, desired of the trustees for *Georgia*, that the weights and measures, with the prices and qualities of the goods to be exchanged for deer-skins might be settled and fixed: that none should be allowed to trade with the *Indians* in that country, without a licence from the trustees; that so the *Indians*, in case of injury or fraud, might know where to complain: that there might be but one store-house in each *Indian* town, from whence the traders should supply them with goods at the fixed prices. Because, he said, the traders had often, in an arbitrary manner, not only raised the prices of their goods, but also given them short weight and measure; and that by their impositions they had frequently created animosities between the *English* and *Indians*, which had often ended in wars prejudicial to both. These matters were regulated according to his desire; and both the importation and use of spirituous liquors prohibited in *Georgia*, by acts of the King and council. Why might not the same benefits be allowed the six nations, and other *Indians* who are in alliance with us? why are not the traders of other colonies laid under the same restraints? However, the making of laws signifies nothing, unless

unless care be taken to have them put in execution: for in 1739, when *Tomo Chichi*, and other chiefs of the *Creek* nations, came to compliment general *Oglethorp* at *Savannah*, they complained; that notwithstanding the regulation in 34, the *Indian* traders, who came among them from *Carolina*, used bad weights and measures. He therefore desired that the general would order them brass weights and sealed measures, to be lodged with each of their kings. The same likewise might be done for the six nations.

The chief reason why the *French* have so far succeeded in their enterprizes beyond the *English*, is, in the opinion of Mr. *Colden* \*, because "the *Indian* affairs are the particular care of the governor and other principal officers in *Canada*, who have the greatest knowledge and authority: whereas those affairs in *New York* are chiefly left to the management of a few traders with the *Indians*, who have no care for, or skill in public affairs, and only mind their private interest."

In short, Mr. *Kennedy* is the more earnest to have the method he proposes for a remedy to take place, as "being well assured, he says, that there is no law which can be contrived, or oath framed, to bind a handler."

Should a few knavish individuals of one colony be suffered to ruin all the colonies? for Mr. *Kennedy* † rightly observes, "that if ever *New York*, *Albany*, and *Hudson's* river, should get into the hands of an enemy, every other colony would soon follow." And his observation ought to be the more regarded, since the *French* are of the very same opinion, as appears from their scheme of 1688, which was grounded on that principle.

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\* P. 35.

† P. 23.

If we expect any assistance in our wars from these *Indians*, I should think that above all things care would be taken to furnish them with good fire-arms. Mr. *Kennedy* is of opinion, "that if this single abuse was rectified, it might be sufficient to keep the six nations in our interest." And cannot so much be done to save the colonies? yet something more than this is necessary to be done: for as the whole subsistence of these people depends on keeping their guns in order, a smith ought to be sent to reside among them, that they might not be obliged to travel two or three hundred miles to an *English* settlement to get a lock mended, which might occasion the loss of their hunting season. Since therefore he would be a most useful and necessary man to them, "A smith, says Mr. *Kennedy's* friend \*, is more likely to influence them than a Jesuit; especially as they think much more of their temporal than spiritual affairs." These smiths, if men of tolerable understanding, might be of farther use, as they and their sons might become interpreters; nothing being more useful and wanting in the colonies than good and honest ones. They might also be employed to supply the *Indians* with goods. In 1734 the assembly of *New York* voted an allowance for maintaining a smith among the six nations; but it does not appear that any person of that trade was sent.

"In my opinion, says Mr. *Colden* †, the government of *New York* have, on all occasions, been exceedingly to blame, in not having some men of experience among the *five nations* to advise and direct them on all emergencies of importance. The *French*, continues he, are

\* P. 45.

† P. 162.

" very



“ very careful of this ; and the officers of the  
 “ regular troops are obliged to take their tours  
 “ among their *Indians*, while the captains of the  
 “ independent companies of fusillers at *New York*,  
 “ live like military monks, in idleness and luxu-  
 “ ry.”

Since the time in which the *French* suffered so much by the incursions of the five nations, they have endeavoured, by various methods, to draw them off from the *English* interest, and attach them to their own : but at the same time are contriving under hand how either to destroy or subdue them : and should they ever fall under their power, their first business, in all probability, would be to cut them entirely off. For these people have brought on them so many disgraces, and been such a perpetual thorn in their sides, that they can never sincerely love or forgive them. The five nations, very likely, think the same themselves ; and this may be one reason why, notwithstanding all the ill usage they have received, that they still incline to hold with the *English*.

It is a matter of the greatest importance to our colonies not only to preserve the friendship of the few nations who are in our interest, but also to endeavour all they can to gain others over. They will be of essential use to stop the progress of the *French* thro' the back countries ; and serve as advance guards to the colonies ; while surrounding them without, like a strong wall, they will prevent those dangerous neighbours from breaking into them. On the other hand, if they become our enemies, the colonies will not only lose that sure defence which they would prove against the *French* power, but joining with them they would enter together on all sides ; and in that case

case what calamities would ensue may more easily be imagined than described.

“What to me is most surprising, says Mr. Kennedy\*, that altho’ there is hardly a colony on the continent but what is a match for all Canada, yet by a proper management of their Indians they [the French] keep us all, both in time of peace and war, in a constant dread and terror.” While we take care to keep the Indians on our side, they will not only keep the French in awe, but by their means we might, whenever we pleased, ruin their two colonies, by taking from them not only their trade but their country: for they could not hold out three months against the power of the English, supported by the Indians.

Some think that by using proper measures, not only the Indians who have deserted us may be gained back again; but even many of those nations brought over who have always been in the French interest. Both these things may be possible: but it must not be thought that this is because the French use them worse than we do: on the contrary, they treat them infinitely better. They do not sell them spirituous liquors to destroy their health and consume them; nor make them drunk and then cheat them of their goods, as our traders have done. Nor are these abuses committed only in some of the northern colonies. I could mention some late pranks of the south Carolina traders among the Charokees, which had involved many other English besides the aggressors, in imminent danger of being massacred; and might have occasioned the revolt of that numerous nation to the French; who prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors among the Indians, (tho’

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some may be conveyed by stealth) and in matters of trade they deal very honestly by them: However they may be the *gens de mauvais foy* to us, not they, but we, are the *gens de mauvais foy* to the *Indians*. What difference is there between the *French* seizing our lands, and our defrauding the *Indians* (I will not say of their lands but) of their furs? Some of the letters from *Virginia* exclaimed against the *Indians* for deserting their troops in the late engagement: but can we blame them if they are treated by their *English* in the barbarous manner before-mentioned? They see by long experience that we make use of them only as tools to serve a present purpose: court them when we have need of them, and when the business is over neglect and despise them, cheat and leave them in the lurch. Do not we set them an example of insincerity? can we expect they should be more faithful and kind to us than we are to them?

The *French*, besides using the *Indians* better than do the *English*, attach them to their interest, by conforming to their ways of living, by intermarrying with them, and by bringing them over to their religion. This, which they know to be their surest game, is managed by their artful and indefatigable priests, who disperse themselves for the purpose among their tribes wherever they dare venture, and have the least prospect of success; while the *English* rather avoid than seek to make converts of them. A negligence which must prove fatal to us in every part of the world where popery prevails; that inhuman monster which, if it had power, would let nothing live but itself.

If therefore the *Indians* seem inclined to take part with us rather than the *French*, it is wholly

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out of interest. They know that the greater part of the goods which they buy of the *French* come from the *English*; and that therefore they can trade to more advantage with our colonies, by having them there at a cheaper rate than in *Canada*. The journey likewise to *Oswego* or *New York*, is much nearer and less inconvenient than to *Montreal* or *Quebek*. This is the chief, if not only motive, which can incline them to an alliance with us rather than the *French*; whose manners and way of proceeding with them, in most other respects, (excepting perhaps the article of government) must needs be more agreeable to them.

Hence many are of opinion, it must be only when the several *Indian* nations, especially the more remote, see they can no longer be supplied by the *French* with the goods they want, that they will be inclined to resort to our colonies, and become our friends. The first step, therefore, which to them seems necessary to be taken in order to draw the *Indians* thither, is absolutely to prohibit that illicit trade which has been so long carried on at *Albany*, of furnishing the *French* with *English* manufactures. Others on the contrary say, that by putting a stop to that trade we should only oblige the *French* to fetch the same kinds of goods from *France* and other *European* countries, and so lose a very profitable branch of trade without gaining our ends with the *Indians*. To which it is answered, that if this could be done the *French* would have done it before now; and that was it done, their markets would be dearer than they are at present; which would infallibly bring the most distant *Indians* to our colonies. This, they say, has been confirmed by experience of several years; and would in time,  
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of itself, secure as well as enrich the northern colonies. The six nations, who always remonstrated against this trade as ruinous both to their own and the *English* interest, in a conference at *Albany* in 1719 alledged, that "if the *English* do not supply the *French* with goods from that place, they cannot furnish the *far Indians* with what they want, and hardly those who live near them: for they get but little goods themselves from *France*." This seems to be confirmed, in some measure likewise, by the letter sent by Mr. *Vaudreuil*, governor of *Louisiana* in 1744, to count *de Maurepas* then superintendent of the marine; complaining of the benefit which the *English* reaped by the inability of the *French* to furnish the *Indians* with the goods they wanted, either as to quality or quantity; therefore desires an augmentation of 80,000 livres worth, and sends a list of *English* trading goods for patterns. Indeed if the *French* can have the same commodities as easily from home or elsewhere, their purchasing them from the *English* should seem to be solely with a view to keep the *Indians* from resorting to the *British* colonies; and their prohibiting this trade with *Albany*, at the same time that they seem wholly to depend on it, without substituting any other in its place, looks like a disguise, tho' a very odd one, to conceal their design. If this be really the case, it would be a sufficient reason of itself for suppressing the *Albany* trade: and supposing the *French* should import goods to *Canada* immediately from *Europe*, it might be proper to consider, whether the *Indians* gained by such a step would not over-balance the loss which we should sustain in trade.

'Tis certain the governor of *Canada* might easily put a stop at once to that illicit trade; and

why does he not ? we are told if he did the *Kabnuaga* or *praying Indians*, who subsist by it, would presently quit the country and return to the five nations from whom they deserted. But is it likely he would deprive the *French* company of such considerable advantages, by letting the prime beaver skins be carried to the *English*, for sake only of retaining 100 or 150 *Indians* at most, in his interest, when he has enough without them ready to serve him on all occasions ? The true reason therefore after all for such conduct, seems to be either the impossibility of supplying the *Indians* in any other manner with the goods they want, or to prevent the northern *Indians* from resorting to the *English* colonies : but in case those *praying Indians*, as they are called, are really of so much value to them as it is alledged, why might they not be of equal value to us ?

The decision of the point here in dispute is of vast moment to the *British* interest, and very well deserves the nicest scrutiny of the board of trade. As it depends on a fact which is to be ascertained only by experience, I will not offer my opinion : but this I think I may venture to say, that if the *Albany* illicit trade was destroyed, and the navigation of the lakes was made free by destroying the forts of *Niawgra* and *De-troite*, before-mentioned, or erecting others in their neighbourhood, we should soon share the fur trade of the north and western *Indians* with the *French* ; and that in case the *Hudson's* bay trade was laid open, we should have it almost wholly to ourselves ; even altho' the *French* could get *Indian* goods from *France* or elsewhere, to put off at the same rates they do now : but while the company sell their goods so excessively dear to the *Indians*, and the navigation of the lakes is shut up by those two forts,

forts; no wonder so much of the fur and peltry go to the *French*, who sell them much cheaper than the company, and so little to the *English* of the colonies, who sell them one half cheaper than the *French*.

When a firm peace and friendship is established with the six nations, endeavours ought to be used to bring back their brethren the *Praying Indians*, who, provoked by the villainous treatment (as Mr. *Kennedy* calls it) of the handlers, went over to the *French*. This was so long ago as between the years 1670 and 80. These are converts settled at *Kabnuaga*, a village on the river *St. Lawrence*, a little to the north of *Montreal*, and are greatly cherished by the *French*, they being their principal fighting *Indians*. It is by them also that the trade is carry'd on at *Albany*: and but for them in all probability the six nations would have been destroyed before now by the *French*: for they not only refuse going to war against them as their brethren, but have given them intelligence of designs formed against them in *Canada*, for which and other reasons it is judged, that by proper methods they may be recovered.

Now, the most proper method that appears is to destroy the *Albany* illicit trade, which is their only subsistence; at least, it is certain, that before they can be recovered, it must for that purpose be destroyed. This trade is, doubtless, the greatest tie on them to the *French* interest; but the *French* employ them in it chiefly as spies, to gain intelligence how matters go in *New York*, with which province they are as well acquainted as the inhabitants themselves; and to carry on any secret correspondence with the *Mohawks*, from which tribe chiefly they are the deserters. Mr. *Kennedy* says, \* "they must be brought back, cost what it will."

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Mr. Colden, speaking of an opportunity of recovering the *Praying Indians*, lost for want of being pursued \*, says, "it might have been of great consequence: but such matters, continues he, "where there is not an immediate private profit, are "seldom pursued by the *English* with that care and "assiduity, with which they are by the *French*."

How indefatigable the *French* are to gain the *Indians*, and set them against the *English*, as if their friendship was the *sine qua non*, is evident from the letters of Mr. *Vaudreuil* governor of *Louisiana*, to his friends in *France* in 1744, found on board the *Golden Lyon* prize, taken by Capt. *Aylmer*, commander of the *Port-Mabon* man of war †; wherein is shewn the artifices which he made use of to impose on, and draw over, the *Chickasaws*, who duped him after all.

There is the more reason to believe that the *Kabnuagas* might be induced to return, if what Dr. *Douglas* says be fact, that the *Arrseguntookooks* and *Weweenoks*, two tribes of the *Abenakki* *Indians*, the most inveterate of all the *English* enemies, submitted to the crown of *England* in a congress held at *Falmouth* in *Kasko* bay, the 27th of September 1749. These are by the *French* called the *Missions of St. Francis* and *Bekancourt*; and dwell on the south side of the river *St. Laurence*, on rivers of the same names, one 40, the other 30 leagues above *Quebek*. †

If I say (for I own I much doubt it) these *Abenakki* tribes have submitted, why (if proper means be used) may not the rest? whose friendship, next to that of the six nations, is of most importance to the northern colonies. These *Indians*, altho' scattered and few, like all the northern *Indian* nations (for they do not exceed 650 fighting men) having

\* P. 199. † See the present state of *Louisiana*, 1744.

† *Dougl. Summary Amer.* Vol. II. p. 4.

having the whole country, from the borders of *New England* to the gulf of *St. Laurence*, in their possession, would be of vast use to prevent the incroachments of the *French* in that part of the continent, and favour any attempt which we might have occasion to make against *Canada*. The forts built along the river of *St. John*, and particularly that at the head of the *Kennibek*, would greatly help to compass this design: but nothing of this kind can be hoped for, so long as that almost implacable animosity subsists, which reigns between the people of *New England* and them, on account of ancient quarrels. Some methods, therefore, should be taken to make them forgo their mutual resentments; and if possible (for some will not allow it to be possible) effectually reconcile them. As the *Cherokees* are a good barrier to *Carolina* against the *French* of *Louisiana*, so might the *Abenakki*, by good management, be made a strong one between *New England* and *Canada*.

After all, there seems but little hopes yet of succeeding in this desirable end: for, instead of gaining over any of those *Indians*, since the *French* began hostilities, we have lost *Indians*: for most of the tribes on the *Ohio* stood neuters, and the rest deserted as in the battle of the meadows. What has a worse aspect, the last news from *New York* brings advice that the *Mebikander* or *River Indians*, who dwelt on *Hudson* river above *Albany*, are gone over to the *French*. This must be owing to either resentment for some former, or some late ill usage, particularly in trade. If the latter be the case, what can we say, but that the people who are devoted to unjust lucre, are devoted to ruin?

*Some remarks on Nova Scotia, and the Ohio affair.*

**N**OW we are upon *Nova Scotia*, I must take notice, that it is by this province only that the *French* can be hindered from surrounding all our colonies: for they have settled and built forts to the south of *Canada* river, in all other parts but this; from which they may always be excluded on the land side, in case the chain of forts on the river *Kennibek*, should be carry'd on to the river *St. Laurence* along the *Cbaudiere*. By means of one fort built at the mouth of this last river, and another at the mouth of the *St. Francis*, or one of those between the other two, we might be able at any time to obstruct the communication by water, between *Quebek* and *Montreal*, as well as annoy them. This could be done the more conveniently, as those forts might be readily supplied with every thing, by a third to be erected, as before-mentioned, at the heads of those two rivers; which might itself be readily furnished with all kinds of necessaries from both *New York* and *New England*, by the river *Albany* and *Konnektekut* (which rise in its neighbourhood) as well as the *Kennibek*. With regard to which last, it is worth observing, that the distance from the mouth of it to *Quebek* is not half so great as that from *Boston* to *Quebek*, and but one third of that from *New York* to *Quebek*; a circumstance which ought to make us more earnest both to settle and fortify this river.

I hope we shall not be afraid to build upon our own frontiers, lest it should disoblige the *French*, who have taken the liberty to build within them. For my part, I think we ought not to forbear doing any thing which may disgust or offend them; since

since they have done every thing which they could think of to disgust and provoke us. In short, to make ourselves amends, we ought to erect a few forts within their settlements, none fitter for the purpose than the last-mentioned three, and then let them take their remedy: for they cannot do worse than they have done; and, perhaps, this would be the readiest and least expensive way to make them quit our territories and withdraw within their own.

The province of *Nova Scotia*, besides being a strong barrier against the *French*, as well as defence to our northern colonies, is of importance to us on many other accounts; but on none more than that the *French* think it would be of importance to them. That they do so is evident from the unwillingness with which they gave it up at the treaty of *Utrecht*; and the extraordinary methods which they have been taking ever since to get it out of our hands again. This will appear also from the character which their writers give of it.

*Denys*, in his description of *North America*, speaking of *Acadia*, in his dedication to *Lewis XIV.* recommends it "as the principal part of all New France: the most useful, and easy to be peopled." Another writer, in a memoir published at the time of the intended conquest of our colonies, in 1688, speaks thus of it: "*Acadia* so useful, on account of the beauty and security of its ports, the fertility of its soil, the advantage of its mines, the abundance of its fish, and the facility of making the fishery sedentary." To these may be added the vast plenty of excellent timber which it affords for building ships.

These are the considerations which make the *French* so fond of *Nova Scotia*, and the same considerations

siderations ought to endear it no less to *Britain*, whose riches and power consists in its commerce and shipping.

There are two expressions in the last quotation, which I shall take an occasion to explain. One is what he calls a *sedentary fishery*, by which is meant no more than a fixt or settled fishery; and to be sure almost every part of the coasts of *Nova Scotia* affords conveniency for such settlements, especially the coasts of the *Peninsula* from *Cape St. Mary* to *Canso*.

By *the beauty of its ports* is to be understood the great conveniency as to depth, capaciousness, wood and water, in which they are to be exceeded by no country in the world. The flood in some of them, particularly *Port-Royal*, rises 28 feet, which qualifies it for receiving the largest ships: and altho' that port is not so conveniently situated for trade as *Halifax* and other ports on the south-east side of the *Peninsula*, yet it is capable of holding the whole navy of *England*; and what is very remarkable as well as of great importance, is almost the only place in all *America*, excepting *Sbegnikto* (where the sea rises above double that height) in which men of war may be conveniently docked.

The proceedings of the *French* in *Nova Scotia*, from its first settlement, having been treated of at large in the pamphlet above-mentioned; I shall pass from thence to *Virginia*, and speak a few words concerning their present proceedings in the country of the *Ohio*, and the title which they set up to it.

This river runs with a very rapid and winding course, thro' one of the most fertile and beautiful countries in the world; consisting mostly of spacious plains covered with trees of various kinds,

such as large walnut and hickory, mixed frequently with poplars, cherry-trees, sugar-trees, and the like. So that whether we regard the fineness of its stream, or the lands thro' which it passes, it well deserves the name it bears of *Obio* or *Hobio*, which signifies the *Fair River*. It rises from two or three little lakes at the back of *New York* province, a little to the west of the *Alliganeey* mountains, to the south of the country of the five nations, and to the east of lake *Erri*. It is for the general very broad, especially towards the mouth, and has a course of above 600 miles thro' a country such as we have described, so many miles square. Ten or a dozen large rivers fall into it, besides an infinite number of smaller streams; all abounding with excellent fish of several kinds, like the *Obio* itself, which breeds the cat-fish, of a prodigious size. Formerly divers nations dwelt along this river and its branches; among the rest were the *Showanongs*, or *Sattcanas*, a very powerful people, who had more than 50 towns in their possession: But about the year 1685 they were all either destroyed or driven out of the country by some of their neighbours; and the *Twigtwis*, with other nations, came and settled in their room, altho' some remains of those different tribes are still to be found, particularly of the *Showanongs*.

As this country belongs to *Virginia*, being within its grant, (which includes all the inlands of *America* between certain latitudes, from the *Atlantic* ocean to the south sea) the inhabitants of that province began pretty early to visit it. Col. *Wood* particularly, who dwelt at the falls of *James's* river, in 1654, sent proper persons; who passing the *Alleganeey* mountains, entered the country of the *Obio*, and in ten years space discovered several branches, not only of that river, but also of the *Mississippi* itself.

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The *Virginians*, invited by the fertility of the country, and friendly behaviour of the *Indians*, continued their visits thither; and altho' they made no settlements, yet they traded with the natives, and many private persons went and resided among them for the greater conveniency of carrying on that trade: especially after the five nations had conquered the *Illinois* and all this country of the *Obio*, as far as the river *Illinois* and the *Mississippi*; to which the *English* became farther intitled, in right of the conquerors, who about the same time became allies of *Great Britain*. Mean time, the *French* having, in 1699, made a settlement at the mouth of the *Mississippi*, and opened a communication between that place and *Canada*, (by means of the *Illinois* river, which enters the *Mississippi*, in about the 40th degree of latitude,) began to form a design of joining those two colonies together. They assigned the river *Illinois* the bounds between them; and denominated all the country from thence southward to the gulf of *Mexico*, by the name of *Louisiana*, in honour of their King *Lewis XIV*. Their view in this was to give themselves a title to all the country on both sides the *Mississippi* (on which river likewise they conferred the name of *Louis*) and to seize it under that pretence, whenever they found themselves strong enough to effect it. They began in the infancy of this southern colony to build forts along the *Mississippi*, and by degrees to enter the *Obio*, at whose mouth they built a fort also by which river, and the *Wabash*, they found a shorter and more convenient rout to and from *Quebek*, than by that of the *Illinois*. Mean while the *English* continued their intercourse and traffic with the *Indians* of the *Obio* country, so much to their advantage, that in 1716, Col. *Spotswood* then governor



governor of *Virginia*, got a law past there for erecting a company to trade with them. This trade was settled so greatly to their satisfaction, that considerable numbers repaired to *Christiana* fort, which was built by the company for that purpose. He likewise laid an excellent scheme for extending that trade, and raising fortifications even on the banks of the lake *Erri*: nor was there any person in *America*, says our memorialist of 1732, better qualified to execute such a scheme. But, because it was “ managed by a company, “ continues the same writer, it was opposed in “ *England*, and a repeal of the law procured, to “ the inexpressible loss of all these colonies: altho’ “ without a company the design was impracticable; unless it had been made the business of “ the whole government.”

If Col. *Spotswood*’s scheme had been followed, the *Ob’o* might have been settled before this, and the present distractions prevented; but, when was there ever a right measure taken till lately for the advantage and security of the colonies?

Things stood thus till about the year 1725, when the *French* being no longer able to supply the *Indians* of this country with the goods they wanted; the *Twigtwees* or *Miyamis* a nation independent, and much more numerous than the six nations, repaired directly to *New York* and *Albany*, there to trade with the *English*. This brought on an alliance with those *Americans*, and a greater intercourse of the *English* than before, invited by the trade and beauty of the country. It likewise begat a desire of reviving *Spotswood*’s scheme. Accordingly, in 1730, endeavours were used to obtain a grant from the crown of those excellent lands; and proposals made to transport large numbers of *Palatines* to settle it. But this  
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good attempt was also frustrated : perhaps, by the same bad policy which frustrated the former.

However, at length, in 1749, when it was too late, as appears by the event, a grant was obtained of 600,000 acres in this country, to certain merchants and others, of *Virginia* and *London*, who associated under the title of *The Ohio company*.

Mean time the governor of *Canada* disgusted to see the *French* deprived of such a considerable nation of *Indians* as the *Twightwees*, with their trade; and considering too, that in case the *English* were once firmly settled in the country, that the hopes of possessing it, and even of passing that way to *Louisiana*, would be entirely cut off from his nation, in the year 1750 wrote to the governors of *New York* and *Pennsylvania*, acquainting them that our *Indian* traders had incroached on their territories by trading with their *Indians*; and that if they did not desist he should be obliged to seize them wherever they were found. Might not one have thought, that on such warning as this those colonies would immediately have taken the alarm, raised forces, and under their protection, with the *Indians* leave, set about building forts for security of their traders? instead of this they went on settling without taking any precautions for their security.

Perhaps they imagined the *French* were in jest : nor did this message divert the *Ohio* company from their design of having a survey made of the country as far as the falls in that river. But while Mr. *Gist*, employed for that purpose, was in his progress in spring 1751, some *French* parties with their *Indians* (for they do nothing without *Indians*) seized three *English* traders and carried them to a fort which they were then building on one of the branches of lake *Erri*; having before built another

other at the mouth of the river *Wabash*. On this the *English*, who were scattered thro' the country, retired to the *Indian* towns for shelter; and the *Twightwees* resenting the violence done to their allies, assembled to the number of 5 or 600, and scoured the woods till they found three *French* traders, whom they sent to *Pensylvania*.

While these things were doing, the *French* were making preparations for building a fort on the south side of the lake *Erri*; of which proceedings Mr. *Hamilton*, then governor of *Pensylvania*, having received advice, he laid before the assembly of that province the necessity which there was to have some places of strength and security built on the *Ohio*, under the name of *trading* or *truck-houses*, which might serve for retreats to their *Indian* traders: the proposal was approved of and money granted for the purpose; but as the means proposed for raising it were not complied with, nothing was done, and an opportunity given to the *French* to finish their second fort.

Repeated complaints of these encroachments being made to the governor of *Virginia*; at length, towards the end of the year 1753, major *Washington* was sent to the commander of those forts to demand a reason for his hostile proceedings, and required him to withdraw with his forces. The commander denied that any thing like hostilities had been committed, but refused to obey the summons; and the officer of the near fort being asked a reason for making several of the *English* prisoners, told him, "that the country belonged to them; that no *Englishman* had a right to trade on those waters; and that he had orders to seize every one who should attempt to trade on the *Ohio* or its branches."

At

At the same time that major *Washington* was dispatched towards the *French* forts, a resolution was taken to build a fort near the forks of the *Ohio*, and as the major was on his return, he met the stores and other materials on their way thither. But next spring the *French* coming down from their forts, as they had declared the year before, took that fort ere it was finished, and pursuing their design drove the *English* quite out of the country, back into the more settled part of *Virginia*, in the manner as hath been related in the public papers : nor was this to be wondered at, considering how unprepared we were to resist them.

The undertaking to make these settlements and build forts, without any force to support them, was the more extraordinary, if the memorialist of 1732, in speaking of the former attempt, hath represented the state of things rightly. " It were truly to be wished, saith he, that this " project was practicable : for such a frontier " on that part would be highly useful : but as it " is presumed that they must first ask leave of " those who will never grant it, *viz.* the *French*, " who are extremely jealous of extended settle- " ments, it would be in vain, under the present " state of affairs, to attempt it."

This shews that the *French* had, even then, either taken possession of the country, or at least declared that the *English* should not make any settlements in it ; and that it was generally believed they were able to make good their declaration. And if it was in vain to attempt such a thing at that juncture, it certainly was more in vain to attempt it at present ; I mean without a sufficient force, when the *French* were become

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considerably stronger, had actually built forts in the country, and threatened to bring troops to oppose our designs.

However, 'tis probable the *French* would not have been able to compass their purpose, had not the *Indians* either stood neuter or deserted our party. That they behaved in this manner, was owing, 'tis said, to the building of that fort, and the *Obto* grant being made without their privity or consent.

They were greatly incensed to think, that the *English* should take upon them to dispose of their lands without any title to them, either by gift or purchase. If this be so, it is no wonder that they should rather take part with the *French*, who openly declared their design of establishing themselves in the country, than with the *English*, who were clandestinely depriving them of their lands, at the same time they professed friendship. Such dealing likewise serves the *French* another way, as it helps to confirm the suspicions which they are continually instilling into the minds of the *Indians*, that the *English* covet their lands; and that, whatever they may profess with their mouths, they are contriving how to ruin them in their hearts; and thus they gain ground among the *Indians*, while the *English* lose ground.

That the *Indians* gave no consent, either to the grant of their lands or building of the fort, seems evident from many circumstances. When Mr. Gift or Gbist in 1751 went to survey the country along the *Obto* for the company, he was very careful to conceal his design from the *Indians*, who were no less suspicious and inquisitive about it. At *Logstown* particularly, the *Delawares* wanted much to know his business; and he not answering them readily, they suspected he came to settle their lands, and made use of many threats:

but at length it seems they were pacified, on being told that he came with a message to them from their king, meaning the king of *England*.

'Tis certain too from the speech of *Sbingis*, the half king, to the *French* commandant, which he repeated to *Washington* at this place, that the *Indians* asserted "their right to the lands against " both *French* and *English*: that they threatened " the *French* for daring to come and take their " land by force and build on it; declaring that " the land belonged to neither of them; and " that they had already told the *English* so." Major *Washington* said nothing to contradict this; nor did he mention any thing about building a fort in the council which was held concerning the *French*; " he even concealed the real intent of his journey to the *French* fort from the " *Indians*, putting them off with some excuse," as if he was conscious that to summon the *French* to withdraw, implied a tacit claim to the country. Neither is there in all the relation of his journey any intimation of the *Indians* consenting to build a fort, any more than of the company's design to build one. The assembly of *Pennsylvania*, indeed, were informed by one of their agents, that the *Indians* had given consent for building a fort on the *Obio*: but in this they found, upon due enquiry, that they had been deceived. On calling that person to an account for imposing on them, he pleaded the orders of a certain principal man: this principal man denying the fact, the other sent up his letter or instructions to the assembly. But altho' the letter proved what he alledged, yet they did not think it any excuse for the deception; and therefore took, what they thought, a proper method to make him sensible of their resentment, by confiscating

fistating a round sum of money, which was due to him. The sufferer (who deserved no less punishment for being instrumental in burning out a great number of settlers on the river *Susquebanna*, not long before) finding he could have no indemnification from the governor, whose tool he had been, in revenge went and discovered the secret of the *Obio* grant to the *Indians*, and spirited them up to call in the *French* to drive out the *English*. It was from a principle of revenge also, in another disgusted proprietor under the new grant, that the imposition we are speaking of came to be discovered. In short we are told, that the present *French* invasion had its rise from the *Obio* company's building the store-house at *Will's Creek*. For the *Indian* trade, which before was carried on with *Pensylvania* by the river *Susquebanna*, was by means of that store-house and a waggon-road, opened thro' the country, carried into *Virginia* by way of the *Potômak*: that the *Pensylvania* traders considering this as an injury done to them, in revenge infused jealousies into the minds of the *Indians*, that the *English* were going clandestinely to seize their lands: that the clamor among the *Indians* alarmed the *French*: and that the building the fort on the *Obio* confirming the information which they had received of the grant, they in resentment joined with the *French* to defeat the *English* designs.

This is the account given by some who were acquainted with the whole transaction: by which the assembly at *Philadelphia*, and several worthy members of the *Obio* company, were abused by such unworthy ones.

The reader may judge from such proceedings as these, what it is which hath lost us the warm hearts of the *Indians*; and how difficult it must be to recover our credit with them, after having dealt



so deceitfully. Such proceedings as these, which tend to ruin the colonies, ought to be made known, that a stop may be put to them for the future.

The best way, therefore, to avoid contests and animosities, would be to drop all such claims to the lands of *Indians*; and purchase them gradually, as we advance in our settlements, which may be done at a small expence. For it would be better to buy their friendship, tho' dear, than to lose the assistance of people without whose good will we cannot possibly maintain our footing any where. I would advise this method particularly with respect to the *Ohio* country; for if we should neglect it, the *French* may do it, in order to make the *Indians* their friends, and perplex us. It might become the *French* and *Spaniards*, or such arbitrary people, to take the *Indian* lands by force, but not the *English*, who should be as tender of the liberty and property of other nations as they are jealous of their own.

This mistaken, not to say unjust, way of proceeding with the *Indians*, seems to arise from a notion that we are intitled to the possession of all their lands, in right of our discoveries: whereas those discoveries give us no more real right to any part of *America*, than the discovery of our coasts by an *Indian* would give those of his tribe a right to *Great Britain*. The discoveries of one nation serve only to exclude any other from settling in the parts so discovered by them: So that this sort of argument can be of force only with *Europeans* against *Europeans*, who make use of it to support their several pretensions. It is in this sense only therefore, that either the *French* or we can pretend any right originally to our *American* settlements; and in this sense I am to be understood, in examining the *French* claim to their

*Ameri-*

*American possessions in general, and to that of the Ohio country in particular.*

## VII.

*Exorbitant claims of the French examined; and an expedient proposed to prevent future disputes.*

**T**HE *French* claim the country of the *Ohio*, as part of *Louisiana*: which name Mr. *De la Salle*, in his passage from *Canada* down the *Mississippi* in 1683, gave to the lands on both sides of it, from the river *Illinois* to the gulf of *Mexico*. They claim it likewise, as being the first who discovered and entered the mouth of the *Mississippi* in 1699, under Mr. *Iberville*. If 'tis true that they first sailed down the *Mississippi*, yet the *English* were the first who discovered and entered the mouth of it. This they did one year sooner than the *French*, on the following occasion. Dr. *Daniel Cox* resolving to revive a claim which he had to the lands of *America*, from 31 to 36 degrees, granted in 1630 by King *Charles I.* to Sir *Robert Heath*, under the name of *Carolana*; in 1698 sent two ships under captain *William Bond* (late store-keeper of *Fort George* in *New York*) to take possession of the country: and as the eastern coast was already settled by *English*, deriving under subsequent grants, they had orders to find out the mouth of the *Mississippi*, (which *La Salle* had in two voyages sought for in vain) and entering into it make a settlement there. The ships went, and having discovered the \* river, one of them past up it above 100 miles; but as the other ship deserted her, they made no settlement. However they took possession of the country on both sides

\* Captain *Bond* brought from thence several curious draughts which he had made of the coast and river, and which are still in being in the possession of captain *R. Riggs*.

of the river in king *William's* name; and left in several places the arms of *Great Britain* affixed on boards and trees, for a memorial thereof: but while the proprietor was applying in *England* for a new grant, Mr. *Iberville* the next year found the mouth of the river, and entering it made a settlement there. *Charlevoix* allows, that three ships were sent from *England* on the discovery of this river, and that one of them did enter the mouth of it: but pretends,† that this was in *September* 1699, and that there was then actually a *French* fort, whose commander *Bionville* stopped her passage. However he says the *English* claimed the country, said they had been there above 50 years before, and would return to drive them out.

If therefore priority of discovery gives a right, the *English* are intitled to all the country in question: for they not only first discovered the mouths of *Mississippi*, but travelled over the countries on the east side of it, particularly that thro' which the *Ohio* and its branches passes for many years together, a long time before *La Salle* sailed down the *Mississippi*. Colonel *Wood* of *Virginia*, in the year 1654, sent one Mr. *Needham*, who spent ten years in this employment, as we are informed, in the description of *Carolina*, by Dr. *Cox*, who had his journal. Also in 1674 captain *Bolts* made another progress thro' the same country. And surely travelling over and viewing a country with a view to settle it, must give a better title to it than sailing down a river, even supposing *La Salle* had navigated it before the *English*: but that is not likely, since the latter were acquainted with both it and the adjacent countries long before that adventurer had any thoughts of the voyage.

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Wherefore, supposing the *English* had no other right or claim to these countries than what they derive from the facts above-mentioned, they have a far better title than the *French*, who want to invert the order of things; and since they were not the first discoverers, will ground their claim on being the last. This preposterous method seems to have become a rule with them: for they follow the same in their pretended claim to all north *America*, which they ground on the discovery of *Verazzani* in 1524, twenty-seven years later than that of the *Cabots* in 1497; and now they would have the discoveries of *La Salle* and *Iberville* to take place of both. But the *English* not liking to confound things, and put the cart before the horse, are resolved to adhere to the old established custom, and found their pretensions on the discovery of the *Cabots*, because it was antecedent to all the others.

Altho' our kings have made grants of lands in north *America* no lower down than the lat. of 29 degrees, yet it seems evident even from the confession of the *French* themselves, that the *English* are intitled to the whole, as far as the cape of *Florida*. *Peter Martyr* counsellor and historiographer to the emperor *Charles V.* relates from the words of *Cabot*, whom he entertained in his house for some time; that he sailed along the coast of *America* so far to the south and to the west, that he had the island of *Cuba* (which lies to the south of *Florida*) on his left hand. *Cabot* in his letter says he sailed southward: but as he does not mention the *precise* degree of latitude to which he sailed, the *Spaniards* pretend that he passed no farther than the 38th degree. Yet *Antony Golvano*, a person noted for his integrity, and governor of *Ternata*, one of the *Molucco* islands; in a history which he wrote of discoveries about the year 1550,

reciting the common opinion adds, that some say he sailed as low as the cape of Florida in the lat: of 25 degrees. The French for the general do not dispute the extent of Cabot's discovery: on the contrary, their authors of most reputation carry it to the end of the peninsula of Florida. *Tibuanus* in particular, their celebrated historian, in his forty-first book, speaking of the first discovery of Florida, says "it is a matter in dispute; for" that the Spaniards ascribe the glory of it to "their countryman John Ponce of Leon, who" gave that name to it, because he landed there "on Easter-day: but, continues *Tibuanus*, it is" more certain, what many affirm, that *Sebastian Cabot* had been there before him in the year "1496." Accordingly *Richelet*, a late author, who published a translation of the history of Florida at Paris in 1709, in a note at chap. 3, fairly acknowledges that Florida had been discovered by Cabot before John Ponce of Leon sailed thither. Now this was in the year 1512, 15 years after Cabot's discovery: and as Ponce landed in that part which according to *Herrera* is properly the country called Florida, extending from the Cape opposite to Cuba for 100 leagues northward, (that is from 25 to about 30. degrees of lat.) consequently Cabot's discovery will comprize not only all what *Verazzani* discovered, from 34 to 56 degrees of lat. or the whole of what his countrymen affect to call *New France*, (as the author of the conduct of the French with regard to Nova Scotia hath justly observed) but likewise all the continent to the south of 34 degrees, as far as the cape of Florida, which includes a great deal more than the French lay claim to by the pretended discovery of *La Salle* and *Iberville*. In short, the French have no title to any part of North America in right of a discovery; not even to Canada, in which they intruded

truded by connivance or neglect of the *English*. The only title which they ever had being by cession made by us in treaties; and that title they have forfeited by their present infractions.

But, whether such discoveries give the *English* a better title or not to the country in question, or whether they derive any right from the conquests made by the *five nations*, whom *France*, by the treaty of *Utrecht*, has acknowledged to be the subjects of *Great Britain*; yet, certainly the *French*, by that acknowledgment, not only have no right to it, but they also violate that treaty by laying a claim to it; much more by entering it in a hostile manner to assert that claim; since, by the 15th article of it, *France* obliges herself not to give any hindrance or molestation to the *five nations*, or the other nations of *America*, who are friends to the *English*.

If a nation hath a right to countries by possession, the *English* have a stronger right to the *Ohio* country, or those to the west of *Virginia*, as far back as the *south sea*, than to any other part of their dominions. They have, if I may so express it, a double right to all that vast tract of *America* from sea to sea lying between the 36th and 44th degrees of north latitude: for they not only discovered it on both sides of the continent; but had formal cessions of it, and took possession a great number of years before the *French* thought of settling in the *Mississippi*, or even knew there was such a river. By this double possession, I mean the discovery and possession of *Virginia* on one side of the continent, and of the kingdom of *New Albion* on the other side, in the *pacific* ocean or *south sea*, lying under the same parallels of latitude.

This country was not only first discovered by Sir *Francis Drake*, in 1578, but the King made a formal

formal surrender of it to the crown of *Great Britain*, and Sir *Francis* took formal possession of it, setting up the arms of *England* as a memorial. Let the *French* shew such a title as this to any of their settlements in *North America*.

This tract, therefore, from sea to sea, between *Virginia* and *New Albion*, ought at least to be deemed indisputably ours, as we are intitled by the double claim. Shall they, after another nation hath discovered both extremities, or sides of a region, thrust in between and seize all the middle part, under pretence that they found it open and unsettled? If this be allowable, what objection can they have to our entering into the middle of their settlements, and fixing ourselves in any place: not only on the *Mississippi*, where their settlements are so far asunder, but also wherever we can find the least vacancy between two towns or plantations of theirs, tho' at ever so small a distance from each other? Let them consider, if private property can be secure upon such rapacious principles; and if one man may not intrude into the possessions of his neighbour, to the confusion of all right and title to the lands?

The *French* pretend non occupancy of *North America* from sea to sea, because they found the *Mississippi* unsettled by the *English*. All the continent was granted as low down as 29 degrees; and nearly all the sea coast so low down divided into colonies, and all the sea coast or eastern parts settled. If any part of land granted or farmed be settled, is not that sufficient to secure a right to the whole? Is every farm granted in *France* settled in every part? is it not enough if a house be built in some part of it? and, since *North America* should be considered as a great farm, or number of *English* farms, why should not that which is a law in one case be a law in the other?

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Does any power dispute with *England* her right to the countries to the north and west of *Hudson's Bay*, altho' settled only in two or three places at the bottom of that bay? Does not *France* pretend a right to the countries on both sides of the river *Mississippi*, as far as its source, tho' settled in very few places, meerly, by right of discovery? why then will she not allow the same right to *England*?

The river *Mississippi*, by means of its wide stretching branches, embraces, as it were within its arms, all the middle and most valuable parts of *North America*. On the east, all the rivers proceeding from the west side of the *Appalachean* or *Alligany* mountains, fall into it, some of which, as the *Ohio*, have a course of at least 1000 if not 1200 miles (reckoning the windings) while the length of such as rise on the east side of those mountains scarce exceed 300. So that supposing we were to yield to them all the country to the west of those mountains, or which is the same, to make those mountains the boundary between the *French* and *English* dominions; what a vast superiority they would have of us with respect to extent of territory, (even supposing they were to be bounded westward by the *Mississippi*.) will appear on a bare inspection of the maps. For the space between the *Atlantic* ocean and the *Appalachean* mountains, is scarce one third of the country bounded on the north by the great lakes and river *St. Laurence*, and on the west by the *Mississippi*: so that in case the *French* are suffered to possess, besides what they have already usurped, all the country within those bounds between the said mountains and that great river, which amounts to more than two thirds of the whole, they will be masters of a dominion larger than all *Europe*: But, when it is considered that the *Mississippi* itself and some of its branches, as the *Missouri*, extend still farther within the body of

of *North America* on the west side, than those which fall into it in the east, the immenseness of the power which may one day arise from the possession of so vast a region, should be enough to frighten the nations, either *English* or *Spaniards*, who are to be their neighbours ; and, who therefore ought to join in putting an early stop to its growth.

I mention these things, because it is said that commissioners are going to meet for settling *American* limits. This was to have been done in 1719, but *France* then declined it, with a view to extend her boundaries as far as she could before she began to treat ; that she might be in a condition to make the larger demands, and to put us to defiance, in case they were not complied with : and, as she hath been obliged to unmask a little before she was fully prepared for a rupture, she will, doubtless, endeavour to amuse us here as long as she can with fair declarations, and offers to adjust matters amicably, to gain time for securing what they have already gotten from us, and farther advancing their scheme. But 'tis presumed our ministers are too well acquainted with *French* artifices, to be diverted one moment from prosecuting the proper measures to make them withdraw from all our frontiers, under pretence of a negotiation. King *William*, of glorious memory, in his declaration of war against *France*, takes notice, that *Lewis XIV.* had invaded his dominions in *America*, spoiled his subjects of their goods, seized their forts, burnt their ships, imprisoned some of his *English* subjects, and caused others to be inhumanly killed, as if he had been the greatest enemy ; “ and yet was so far from declaring himself  
“ such, that at the same time he was negotiating  
“ here in *England*, by his ministers, a treaty of neutrality and good correspondence in *America*.”

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I did not put negotiation among the methods of recovering what the *French* have surreptitiously deprived us of (if that epithet can be applied to what was done before our eyes) as long and dear experience has shewn we can get nothing that way from our dextrous neighbours. Besides, after controverting the cession of *Nova Scotia*, made in the most explicit terms imaginable by the treaty of *Utrecht*, to what purpose can treaties with them serve us? The *French*, if hard pressed, make treaties: but if they are obliged to give up any thing which they have a desire to keep, or don't care to part with, they endeavour to recover it afterwards by collusion or force. Both these methods they have used with regard to *Nova Scotia*, and the country of the *Ohio*.

On the other hand, as they have gotten a kind of possession of all the country, and secured their footing by forts, it seems difficult to conceive how limits can be settled to the satisfaction of both parties: for the *French* will scarce be prevailed to give up amicably even those territories on which they have encroached: and the *English*, for their better security, ought perhaps to have somewhat more: For, since the *French* declare their views to be incompatible with those of the *English*, and have avowed it by the encroachments which they have made on our territories, contrary to the most solemn treaties and engagements; there seems no way left to prevent eternal disputes, but to separate them by certain natural boundaries; which, being fixed and permanent, can neither be controverted nor easily forced, such as rivers, lakes, or mountains.

I am inclined, for your particular amusement, to give you my opinion in what manner the limits ought to be settled on this side of the *Mississippi*, between the *British* colonies and *New France* or *Canada*,

*Canada*, considering these two names as equivocal and convertible terms. The line should begin at the mouth of the river *St. Laurence*, and be drawn from thence thro' the middle of its stream to the lake *Katarakui* or *Ontario*: from thence to be carried thro' the length of the said lake to a place on the north-west side called *Tejaiagon*, and so by the carrying place to a river falling into the lake *Taronto*. Thro' the same, and thence by the rivers and lake *St. Mary* of the *Hurons*, into the *Quatogbe* or *Huron* lake: thro' this lake and thro' the mouth of the *Misbigan* lake (to the south of the isle called *Misbillimakinak*) down the same, to a little river on the west side; and thence over land to a small lake, into which falls the river *aux Renards* or of *the Foxes*: up this river and thro' the lakes to the carrying place, into the lake and river of *Wisconsin*; and down the same, thro' the middle of the stream, to the river *Mississippi*.

This bounding line, I think, cannot be justly objected to: for, first our northern colonies, by right of their grants as well as discovery, all extend as far at least as the river *St. Laurence*; especially as we have a right by the treaty of *Utrecht*, as before-mentioned, to the country of the *Iroquois* or *five nations*, which originally was about the lake *Champlain* and *Richlieu* river; called on that account by the *French* themselves, as well as the *Dutch*, the *Iroquois* lake and river. Besides, this country belongs to us by the submission (if fact) of its present inhabitants the *Aresguntikooks* and *Weweenoks* to the crown of *Great-Britain*, at *Albany* in the year 1749. Then the country of the *Quatogbi's* or *Hurons* between the lakes *Ontario*, *Erri* and *Quatogbe*, with the country between the *Erri* and *Misbigan*, to the south of the *Quatogbe*: and also the country of the *Chiktagbiks* or *Illinois*, between the lake *Misbigan* and river *Mississippi*, were all conquered by the *five nations*;

nations ; in right of whom we claim them, in virtue of the said treaty. So that we could not take in these conquered countries without drawing the line in the manner we have done. According to which partition we leave our neighbours all to the north side of the river *St. Laurence* ; we divide with them the lakes *Ontario*, *Hurons*, and *Michigan* : we keep to ourselves the lake of *Erri* ; and give them that very great one called the *Upper Lake*. This may compensate for any little of the country to the north of the river *Illinois*, which for the sake of making natural boundaries, we may, in the opinion of the *French*, have taken more than our due, on account of the *Iroquois* conquests : nor is it our intention that they should be debarted the free navigation of any of the lakes, but that it should be open to both nations ; only neither of them should build forts on any part or parts of those lakes, excepting such as shall fall to their respective shares.

In like manner may the limits be fixed between *Canada* and the *Hudson Bay* colony, as well as between the southern provinces of the *English* and *Lousiana*, on this side of the *Mississippi* : if rather the *French* thought not to relinquish all to the east of that river, on account of ours being the prior discovery, and confine themselves to the west side ; where the boundaries may be carried on, for adjusting the claims of both parties to the countries on that side of the great river, and beyond its springs to the north and west, as far as the *South Sea* coast, where the *English* have already one spacious country called *New Albion*.

For drawing up the agreement care ought to be taken to describe the boundaries with the greatest exactness and precision ; by specifying the course, situation, and different names of the several rivers, lakes, mountains and other places ; in so distinct and

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accurate a manner, that no room, if possible, may be left for objection or dispute. To do this the more effectually, the line should be surveyed; and the latitudes observed with the greatest accuracy at the most remarkable places, by persons sent from each court. Then maps should be drawn, signed and delivered to each other by the respective commissioners, as counter-parts of deeds, that there might be no pretence for cavil. If the lands in dispute are not worth so much care, they are not worth contending for.

It should likewise be agreed by both nations to abolish the use of all names on either side, which clashed with their respective interests so settled, and had been before employed to keep up the title of one nation to lands or territories belonging to the other. Thus, as it may be presumed, that *France* will acknowledge the right which *Great-Britain* has to her *American* colonies, on the score of priority of discovery as well as long and actual possession, and will quit claim to the same; it will be proper that she should forbear giving to them, or comprehending them under, the name of *New France* or *Canada*, which should solely be confined to the countries agreed by such treaty to belong to her, and be in her division. In like manner *Great-Britain* should cease to give the name of *British* colonies to any lands or countries acknowledged by the treaty to belong to *France*. And the geographers and historians of each nation should be obliged, under certain penalties, to conform themselves to this regulation; in order to remove all prejudices, errors and doubts from the minds of people, with relation to the dominions of each nation, and their respective just boundaries.

I am, &c.

10 Dec.

1754.

## SECOND LETTER.

S I R,

**S**INCE I wrote you my long letter in *December* last, I have received several more letters, remarks and tracts relative to the colonies, from correspondents perfectly well acquainted with the affairs of *America*; particularly two, whose observations I shall at present communicate to you. The first contains a general view of the *British* plantations on the continent, with a curious calculus of the number of whites inhabiting each of them. The second animadverts on various points, worthy the attention of our ministers; particularly those which respect raising a fund, on terms agreeable to the inhabitants of the colonies, sufficient for carrying on the present war, and for their future defence. I shall give you their sentiments in different articles.

## I.

*General view of the British colonies, and number of inhabitants in each.*

**B**RITAIN the political parent of her colonies (like a natural one, who intends to raise a progeny for advantage, strength and power) in their infancy should indulge, nourish and support them. As they encrease and become capable of helping themselves and benefiting their mother country, they should be taught the obligation they owe her: That all their particular and hereditary rights and privileges, are derived from her: that they are bound to obey her laws; and that restraints laid on them are intended for mutual advantage. Their produce and industry should be encouraged

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and



and directed to the good and service of both. They should be governed by the laws of *England* in general, and by their own allowed particular ones : their force ought to be united to strengthen their parent, and assist each other ; and if invaded by a superior power, they should be effectually protected.

Colonies thus prudently and legally managed, would rejoice in their situation, and flourish : would add numbers, strength, and riches to the general common-wealth ; and enable this kingdom to meet the enemy in the gate. But, can any government or ministry act properly with regard to colonies, unless they know their state, by the numbers of people they contain, on which the whole depends ? The colonies on the continent of *America* are by some lessened and depreciated : esteemed the occasions of unnecessary and expensive wars ; depopulators and weakeners of *Britain*. By others they are aggrandized and over-rated monstrously beyond truth. Towns are magnified and multiplied ; the inhabitants made incredibly numerous ; and their power averred to exceed that of large *European* kingdoms. Such false representations may occasion the destruction and loss of the colonies (if not more.) To what can such extravagant exaggerations tend ? what can they produce but inattention to their present circumstances ; neglect or delay of relief ? They may likewise raise and inflame a jealousy, already kindled in the minds of many ; from which source a harsh government, and the bad consequences attending it, hereafter may result.

*Nova Scotia*, the first colony *Britain* possessed on the north-east part of the continent, has shifted the property between the *French* and *English* several times. The first made the greater progress  
in

in settling this country ; and it is said at present to contain upwards of 15,000 souls, improperly called neutral *French*. The *English* by great experience and encouragement, according to the last accounts, have in *Halifax*, *Lunenburg*, and other places, about 5000 men, women, and children ; and these are all the subjects whom this government comprises, exclusive of the military forces.

Altho' the province of *Main* interferes between *Nova Scotia* and *New Hampshire* ; yet, as it is annexed to the *Massachusetts Bay*, *New Hampshire* is mentioned as the next colony. The whole government is but one county : *Portsmouth*, a straggling incontinent town, is the capital. With the addition of territory and people it received from the *Massachusetts Bay*, the number of inhabitants in 1742, were 26,000 whites, besides 500 negroes. The late war was prejudicial to the trade and checked the natural increase of this colony, which has not been countervailed by foreign increase : Therefore at present 30,000 souls must be the utmost amount of its inhabitants at present.

*Massachusetts Bay*, a few years since, was of larger extent and had more inhabitants than at present ; some towns and a large tract of land being adjudged to *New Hampshire* on one side, and some settled towns to *Rhode Island* on the other. It is divided into 11 counties, in which are 153 towns. The names of so many towns have misled strangers as to the number of people. Many of them are but insignificant parishes ; and when in the middle of a town perhaps you may not see three houses. The property of all the lands in this colony are by charter in the people. The general court, as their trustees dispose of them on settled conditions. Grants are generally made of

four, five, or six miles square ; which is always called a town, and a name given it in the grant. A few inhabitants settled within its limits may send a representative to the general court. When 80 are qualified to vote, they must send one or be fined. When 120 are qualified, they may send two representatives ; and a small freehold qualifies. In 1749, thro' poverty, or paucity of inhabitants, *fifty-eight* of these towns refused to send members. *Newberry, Ipswich, Salem, Marblehead, Charlestown, Cambridge*, and possibly a few more have the appearance and contiguity of towns : the rest consist of houses built on each man's plantation. Each of these districts has a form of town-government. *Boston* is the capital of the whole. In 1722, by an order of the select men (magistrates) of the town, the number of souls was taken : it then contained 10,670. By a like order in 1742, there were found in it 1719 dwelling-houses, 166 ware-houses ; 16,382 white people, of whom 1,200 were widows ; and 1514 negroes. Together with the province, this town suffered much by expeditions and presses in the late war. A general small-pox has gone thro' it since ; and much of its trade is diverted. For these reasons its increase can't be very great from that time ; and at present it is difficult to allow it 20,000 inhabitants. The colony in 1735 contained 35,427 white males from 16 and upwards ; in 1741 they were 41,000. From that time there has no real numeration been made ; but the assembly, in a message sent by them to governor *Shirley* in 1747, declare, that 3000 men are a 12th part of the militia. Upon the whole, from the losses sustained by presses, privateering, taking and garrisoning *Louisburg* ; by decay of trade and by desertions occasioned by the extraordinary increase

crease of taxes, more than in other colonies ; (the poll, the faculty, the personal estate of all who reside here but a few months, being taxed, and lately an universal excise on all liquors taking place) therefore 220,000 souls must be a very stretched assignment for this colony.

*Rhode Island* and *Providence* plantations, with the additions from the *Massachusetts Bay* are divided into four counties ; which comprize 24 townships. By an exact census taken in 1748, there were in this colony 28,439 whites, 3077 negroes, and 1257 *Indians*. *Newport* the capital in 1749, contained 5335 whites, 1105 negroes, and 68 *Indians*. So that allowing for the increase of the colony from those times, 35,000 white inhabitants are full as many as can be ascribed to it.

The colonies of *Connecticut* and *Rhode Island* above-mentioned, are the only colonies who, as it were, govern themselves. The people annually chuse their governors, council or assistants, and assemblies. The crown appoints no officers in either, but judges of admiralty, and those of the customs. Their limits are confined by other colonies ; and, as all their lands are private property, they can admit but little foreign increase. Five counties and 68 towns are comprehended in the colony of *Connecticut*. It has no particular capital. *Hartford*, a good inland town : *New London*, and eight or nine more, make a pretty figure for their size, to those who sail thro' *Long Island* sound. But it would be very difficult for any person who travels thro' this colony to find a market in any of its towns. 18 of them are too small and poor to send representatives to the general assembly. All males from 16 to 70 pay a poll tax ; and their militia from 16 to 50, in 1749, were 16,000. Allowing them a very large num-

ber for exempts and increase, one hundred thousand will more than tantamount the people this colony contains.

The advantageous situation of the city of *New York*, in the colony of that name, marks it for the capital of the *English* governments on the *American* continent. The number of inhabitants in this colony, in 1732, was taken by the constables of every town, parish, or district; and they were found to be near 65,000. At the same time the houses in the city were counted by the alderman of each respective ward, and they were found to be something under 1500. Since that time the town has encreased in wealth and inhabitants. Many families removed to it from *Albany*, and the frontiers, in the late *French* war: yet, by losses from the *Indians* and *French* in the exposed back settlements; by the *Cartagena* expedition, enlistments, pressies, and privateering, the natural encrease of the colony was in some measure retarded by that war. It has received little foreign encrease since; and the redundance of *Long Island*, forced out by the barrenness of its inland parts, mostly remove to *New Jersey*. So that allowing to the city as many inhabitants as are allowed to *Boston*; and supposing the whole colony at present to be 100,000, that number will be fully adequate.

Altho' the proprietary colony of *New Jersey* is divided into twelve counties, it has but a few insignificant towns; *Amboy*, *Brunswick*, *Trent-town*, *Burlington*, and *Elizabeth-town*, are all which can bear even the name. *New York* on the east, and *Philadelphia* on the west, draw off the produce, and supply it with other necessaries. A curious author who informed himself of the state of this, and the other colonies, says it might contain, in 1749, nigh 50,000 souls. The litigated uncertain titles

titles to lands, occasioned by the iniquity of the proprietors, has, without doubt, prevented its encrease: 60,000 inhabitants must therefore be a sufficient allowance for it.

The rapid encrease of the colony of *Pensylvania* has occasioned various opinions about the number of its inhabitants. Here is no poll-tax, no militia-rolls to compute by. The city of *Philadelphia* its capital is the only competitor with *New York* for superiority. Both colonies produce in general the same things; both have vast quantities of fine uncultivated lands: but when the great run of foreign encrease is over; (and the emigrations of the *Germans* into other colonies shew that it won't long be confined to *Pensylvania*) 'twill stand no chance in competition. One single circumstance, if there was no other, namely, that the river or harbour of *Philadelphia* is frozen up *communibus annis* nigh three months, must give *New York* the preference. In 1749, the houses in every ward of this city were counted exactly by a set of curious gentlemen, the united sum was 2076 private ones, and 11 houses of worship. In the description written under a very handsome prospect of it, taken in 1753, the number of houses are said to be nigh 2300. It is therefore certain that it can't far exceed *Boston* or *New York* in people.

By some 100,000, by others 125,000 fighting men are affirmed to be in the colony; a number far exceeding the four governments of *New England*. A late pamphlet penned to shew the misapplication, or rather non-application of the great numbers and strength of *Pensylvania*, at this critical juncture, says it contains 220,000 souls, half of whom are *Germans*. An enquiry into the state of this colony was made by order of King *William* a little before his death, and the inhabitants at

that time were scarcely 14,000. By an agreement settled between Queen *Anne*, in the last year of her reign, and the then proprietor, all the property and rights he had were to be surrendered to the crown for 13,000 l. The deeds were drawn and 2000 l. of the money paid ; but the proprietor died (it is said) the day appointed for his executing them.

The *Germans* were first sent to *America* by the bounty of this nation, under the protection of Queen *Anne*. Every thing necessary was provided for them. They were convoyed to *New York* there to be settled on the crown lands ; and if this intention had been executed, the *French* in *Canada* had been for ever effectually confined to their proper bounds : but by the villainy of those in power, this national charity and benefit was defeated. These *Germans*, cheated, abused, and deceived in the grants of lands assigned them, and made the property of avaritious designing men, were forced to seek new habitations. They found their way thro' the woods to good lands in the colony of *Pensylvania*. Here they were used well, and grants made them *bona fide*. They represented the fraudulent usage of one government, and the justice of the other to their brethren in *Europe* ; which determined all future *German* emigrants to prefer this colony. The ways and means of transporting themselves, was not found out, by any considerable numbers, for some time : but the persecution at *Thorn* in *Poland*, obliged them to look for an asylum. From that time a proper canal of conveyance has been found ; and thousands have gone over yearly.

From 1728 to 1729, 6200 foreigners of all sorts arrived at *Philadelphia*. In 1750, 4317 *Germans* arrived, and about 5000 in 1754. The  
*Spanish*



*Spanish* war interrupted this transportation: the *French* war almost stoppt it: So that upon an average, if 3000 *Germans* were imported annually for 30 years past, in all 90,000; and 30,000 be added to them for their increase from the different times of their arrival; and 10,000 be deducted for the dispersion into other colonies, the computation of 110,000 *Germans* for this colony may be right; and that they are half of the people is not disputed. The 220,000 are supposed to be in the five countries of proper *Pennsylvania*, to which add 30,000, a large number for the three lower counties; then the whole of the inhabitants of the colony and its jurisdiction, will stand at 250,000.

The colony of *Maryland* has been compared to *Virginia*, for number of white inhabitants, on account of its receiving most of the transported convicts; but this comparison can hardly be true. *Virginia* from priority of settlement, equality of soil and situation, and by a far superior extent of country, must needs exceed it. Neither of them have any large towns; but those in *Virginia* are more in number, as well as more populous, than those in *Maryland*. By governor *Dinwiddie's* report of the militia in *Virginia*, the inhabitants should not exceed 70,000: but as this account has, thro' the course of it, made large allowances for exempts of all sorts, these two colonies, *Maryland* and *Virginia*, are by us supposed to be on a par for people; and to each of them are allowed 85,000 *Whites*: besides, *Negroes* are very numerous in both.

The counties of *North Carolina*, in lord *Granville's* district, are inhabited equivalent to the neighbouring parts of *Virginia*. The counties to the southward and the parts next to *South Carolina*,

*lina*, are but thinly peopled. *Edenton*, *Bath*, *New-Bern*, *Johnston*, (a county town with one inhabited house) *Beaufort*, *Wilmington* and *New Brunswick*, in any other country would be called villages of little or no note: however, this colony has more white inhabitants than *South Carolina*, whose number some have raised to 45,000.

*South Carolina*, a colony extremely advantageous to *Britain* at present, by its productions of rice and indigo, probably will in time be more so by silk; but has not a sufficient number of *Whites* to the *Blacks*. In 1739 before the great fire, *Charles-Town* the capital, had 450 dwelling houses, with 800 warehouses and kitchens. In 1742 the province militia were 5500: the slaves 49,000. By its vicinity to *St. Augustine* and the *Havannah*, as well as for want of proper protection, this country suffered extremely by the *Spanish* and *French* wars: so that, if they had continued, a few years would have determined the fate of the planter and merchant. Since the peace it has more than recovered its former circumstances: the town is increased and better built, and may now be able to count 600 houses. One benefit it received from the war: necessity obliged the planters to attempt indigo, rice being too bulky to pay the then high freight. They now make it fit for any market; and it is hoped, by a longer continuance of the bounty, will be able in a few years to supply *Britain*. But as the present militia do not exceed 5000, the number of souls in this most improveable colony cannot be estimated at more than 30,000.

*Georgia* as yet is scarce established; however 6000 people may at present inhabit it.

This account of the number of the *British* subjects, men, women and children in the above-

men-

mentioned colonies, is not the production of whim and conjecture. Militia rolls, poll taxes, bills of mortality, returns from governors, late histories, and pamphlets publish'd in the colonies, as well as actual numerations, are the authorities on which it is built: but as none of these come quite up to the present time, large additions are made to each colony for its late increase. If the computation for the rest of the colonies is to be regulated by the census of *Rhode Island* in 1748, which makes its inhabitants 28,439, (and seems to have been taken with great precision and exactness) the number of *Whites* in the colonies, in general, is here over-rated, as *Maryland* certainly is. These 13 colonies extending from *Cape Kanso*, the most eastern extremity of *Nova Scotia*, to the southern limits of *Georgia*, the space of 1500 miles along the *Atlantic* ocean, contain 1,050,000 souls. This is the number, this the strength, which by a late author is preferred, and affirmed to exceed any power or state in *Europe*, excepting the *Germanick* body, *France*, and perhaps *Britain*: These the towns which he compares with *Bristol*, and others in *England*; when *Bristol* alone contains more people than all the capitals of these colonies put together.

I shall close this account with a word or two concerning the militia of the plantations. All the colonies, *Nova Scotia*, *Pensylvania* and *Georgia* excepted, have a militia, consisting of the gentlemen, merchants, yeomen, freeholders, and others in each colony; who have consented by their representatives to be inrolled and trained for the defence of the particular colony or corporation to which they belong. The militia laws of the several colonies differ from each other; nor can the laws of one colony extend to or operate in another,

another, any more than the laws of *London* can at *Bristol*, or *vice versa*. Such is the militia of *America*: out of whom it would be as difficult to form an army to march to the unappropriated frontiers, as it would to make the gentlemen, &c. of *London* to march to oppose an invasion in any remote part of *Britain*. Loose idle people, those without property, are the only people who must compose a standing army in *America*, as they do in *Europe*: but the number of these cannot be very great in a part of the world where property is so easily acquired; and where consequently there are many masters and but few servants.

## II.

*In what time the people of the colonies double themselves; and how a fund may be raised in them sufficient for their defence.*

**M**Y other correspondent, who computes the number of people in the colonies on the continent to be a million, (altho' I should think 900,000 their amount to the full) speaks to a point which the former has not touched upon. He has taken into consideration the increase of the plantation inhabitants, and how often they double themselves. This event, by his computation, however large it may seem, he says, for certain happens every 20 years; and that altho' the estimation of their increase cannot be made from that either of great cities or well inhabited countries in *Europe*, yet there are other principles from whence a tolerably exact calculation may be raised. Any man may have land given him in North *America* for fixing himself and his family, particularly in *New England*; which province he thinks has the advantage

vantage in almost every thing over the other provinces ; especially as to healthy climate, plenty of natural productions, trade, navigation and fishery ; good laws, liberty, and few taxes. In this land such a person may with ease plentifully subsist a family, so that he is not afraid to marry ; and if he looks so forward as to consider how children, when grown up, are to be provided for, he is not discouraged, as he sees more land is to be had either for nothing or at very easy rates. This makes marriages more general, as well as more early in life, in North *America*, by three to one, than in *Europe*. But supposing they are only two to one ; this conformable to the computation used in *Europe* of one to a hundred, will give two marriages for every hundred persons : supposing also that in *Europe* from three to five births are the issue of a marriage ; as these marriages are later in life, from seven to ten births may be allowed to a marriage in the colonies ; and as these marriages may be computed to happen one with another, at 20 years of age, it may be seen how soon the people there are doubled ; many years under 25 : but supposing they did not double in fewer years than 25, consider how much their increase will exceed ours in 100 years.

But so great is the country of North *America*, that notwithstanding this increase, yet till it is fully settled (which will require several ages) labour cannot be had cheap : for no man will be a servant whilst he can be a master ; that is, can get land easily and settle for himself : so that labour is as dear at present in *New England* and *Pensylvania*, as it was thirty or forty years ago ; notwithstanding the number of people in the latter (according to the *Brief State of Pensylvania* lately published) has been increased by the arrival of

100,000 foreigners. Hence the danger apprehended by some of North *America* interfering with *England* in branches of trade which depend on labour, must be at a very great distance. Instead of being terrified with this bugbear, it ought to be considered that as our colonies increase, the demand for *British* manufactures will increase, in a market where foreigners cannot interfere with us: and if by proper laws this trade be kept to ourselves, *England* will scarce be able to supply her plantations, even tho' her whole trade should be confined to them. Ought not this single consideration to remove our apprehensions, and, induce us to act, like a good mother, not so much to restrain manufactures in our colonies?

No labouring man in any part of *Europe*, who knew the advantages of living in our colonies, would work for others for six pence and twelve pence *per* day, when he can get much more than double that sum on his own land in *America*, which he may have given him. This is so well known in *Germany*, that all the laws which can be made there are not able to restrain thousands from going over yearly to *Pensylvania*, to the great benefit of that colony and many others; notwithstanding the pamphlet just before mentioned has represented both them and the quakers in a very untrue light.

What has been said on this occasion by the gentleman who wrote these remarks, more fully accounts for the difficulty mentioned by the former at the close of his, of forming an army out of the militia of *America*; and in how wrong a light that matter is universally understood on this side of the water. For altho' the people of the colonies are properly all militia, and obliged to defend their respective territories, yet those of  
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one province cannot be compelled to march out of it, or to defend any other frontiers than their own. If they assist their neighbours, the motion must be voluntary ; and as, for the generals, they are masters of families, and obliged to obey none but their natural leaders, chosen by their own assemblies, they must be dealt with mildly, not with military rigour. This is the reason why they may be averse to put themselves under the command of officers sent from hence ; and why I have in my first letter recommended placing some of their own over them.

This gentleman earnestly recommends several things as necessary for the security of the colonies which I have mentioned in that letter ; as the augmenting some of our forts already built, particularly that of *Orwégo* ; the building of two vessels to be kept on the *Kadarakui* or *Ontario* lake, and opening the *Hudson Bay* trade. These measures he says, if pursued, “ would at once get us “ into the direct fur trade with the *Indians* “ (which we are now forced to carry on in a “ smuggling way, and at second-hand with the “ *French* traders) and in short ruin *Canada* without fighting.”

In the mean time, as things now stand he is of opinion, that we should greatly distress them, if all the colonies would follow the example of the *Massachusetts* ; which is to keep publick store-houses on their frontiers, and to supply the *Indians* with goods at the first cost : “ for the private traders, “ says this gentleman, often cheat them, and treat “ them ill ; which drives them over to the “ *French*.” He likewise recommends building new forts in proper places ; and above all one at the head of the river *Kinnebek*, a spot which he has  
long



long had his eye upon, as the most convenient imaginable, for the purposes already mentioned in Letter I. art. 3. In short, he says, “ it is the  
 “ very best stroke which at present can be made  
 “ against the *French*, and such as will strike a  
 “ terror into the gates of *Quebek*. This fort he  
 “ would have garrisoned by one independent  
 “ company of 100 men, to be raised either here  
 “ or in *New England*, or else sent from the regi-  
 “ ments at *Halifax*. If our government here  
 “ would but so far countenance and support this  
 “ undertaking as to maintain such a number of  
 “ men, in case of an attack, he is sure that the  
 “ whole force of *New England* would chearfully  
 “ join to defend it : nay, he makes no doubt but  
 “ that the *New England* people would build the  
 “ fort, provided it was furnished with guns,  
 “ powder and ball from hence.”

He judges this proposal may be the more readily complied with, as he is of opinion, “ that from  
 “ henceforth soldiers must always be kept in the  
 “ colonies, as well to defend them against the  
 “ *French*, as to prevent their smuggling trade so  
 “ prejudicial to *England*: also, because they ought  
 “ to be ready at hand to be sent on any occasion,  
 “ either to assist our sugar islands, or to invade  
 “ the *French* or *Spanish* islands. He likewise  
 “ thinks that it is necessary to begin to use the  
 “ people of *North America* to soldiers, which  
 “ may by degrees introduce discipline among  
 “ their *militia*: and no time seems to him more  
 “ proper for it than this, while their thoughts are  
 “ taken up with military affairs and they are pre-  
 “ paring for war. Some time hence when their mar-  
 “ tial spirit subsides, and calmer dispositions take  
 “ place again, the sending soldiers among them  
 “ may

" may not be so well relished." 'Tis certain, that almost any thing may be brought about by well timing it.

This gentleman proceeds to consider the number of soldiers necessary for putting on the *American* establishment. " There ought always, continues he, to be two regiments in different parts of *New England*; one in *New York*; another in *Pensylvania*: one small regiment or a few companies in *Maryland*: a large regiment in *Virginia*; lastly, one to be distributed among the two *Carolinas* and *Georgia*. These regiments ought to be raised in and at the expence of the several governments, and the taxes (which he proposes) will, in a few years, pay for supporting them: in the mean time whatever they may fall short, must be supplied from hence. His scheme requires likewise that arms, ammunition, and cloathing for some few years, should be sent to them: and that the chief officers of all forts, unless some very few, should be appointed out of the natives of the respective provinces, when the regiments are raised."

On this occasion my friend proposes a thing which may seem as strange, as new, to some people. This is to " raise a regiment out of the *French* neutrals mentioned in the preceding article, to be commanded by their own officers; a thing which he is convinced might be brought about with proper management." The only question is, how far they may be depended on, as they are papists, and seemingly in close union under hand with the rest of their nation? as appeared from their behaviour in the late war! However, in case such a regiment was

raised for a trial, the fear of endangering the safety of the rest of their countrymen settled in *Nova Scotia*, might be a check upon them; and in case they should turn rail or desert, it would be a good way of getting rid of them. However, their posts might be assigned in some other province, and at a distance from any *French* settlement.

What seems to have led this gentleman to make such a proposal, is the great inclination which he observes in the *French* soldiers to desert and settle in our colonies, where they can live with more ease and liberty than in the cold and barren country of *Canada*. On this occasion he speaks of a thing as being actually done, which in my former I have given a caution against, supposing it had never been intended; namely, the surrendering deserters on each side. "An agreement," says he, which our officers at *Halifax* in *Nova Scotia*, have been duped into by the *French*." "Some of our men," continues he, may indeed "desert: but for one the *French* would have from us, we should have 100 from them. These too would gladly stay and settle in our colonies; but none of our deserters would ever stay long with the *French*. Nine tenths of all the *French European* soldiers, or others sent to *Canada*, might be induced to come over to our plantations. In short, the best and only inhabitants which the *French* have to depend on, are the *Indians*, and the breed they have from the *Indian* women and *French* soldiers; a measure, says he, which we ought to encourage in our colonies."

After having laid down his plan, my correspondent turns his thoughts on the means for carrying on the war, (which he seems to think inevitable

vitable) and keeping the colonies in a good condition of defence. With regard to this point he proposes three things : first, that the duty on all sugars from our sugar islands, which is now paid in the islands themselves, and (as Mr. Pelham said in the *House of Commons*) now raises but a trifle, should be made payable in *North America* ; to which might be added a duty of one penny *per* gallon on molasses, and two-pence *per* gallon on all rum imported into *North America* ; or else a tax not exceeding twenty shillings to be laid on every thousand acres of land. None of these taxes, he assures me, would be much disliked in *North America*, from whence he has lately received some proposals to the same purport : but is of opinion that they should be paid by way of excise, or by the purchaser, and not by the importer ; that the merchants might not be distressed.

The tax on sugar (translated as above) and that on molasses particularly, would raise a large sum annually, and be an encreasing fund. And there can be the less objection to these, because they arise chiefly from *French* produce : for the duty on sugar, as it stands at present, being paid in the islands, encourages the inhabitants to get it from the *French* : and to my correspondent's own knowledge, not one twentieth part of the molasses, imported into *North America*, is *English*. So that one penny *per* gallon would be a tax chiefly on *French* produce ; and the importer pays as much as that in order to get it run, or else compounds with the port officers to permit its being entered as from our *English* plantations ;" and this likewise he knows to be fact, particularly at *Rhode Island*. The fund raised

from the duties laid on the above-mentioned commodities, our correspondent is positive would be sufficient to answer all the exigencies of the several *American* governments, particularly the governors salaries, after being fixed here, should be first paid out of it ; then those of all their port-officers : The rest to be applied for carrying on the war, or maintaining foldiers.

But in order to reap the full advantage of such taxes, it will be absolutely necessary to destroy the illicit trade which all the colonies have run more or less into ; but none so much as *Rhode Island*, which has carried it on to the highest pitch, and in the most audacious manner.

At this noted place for smuggling, all sorts of *French* as well as *Dutch* produce and manufactures are imported in the most public manner ; and from thence exported to all parts of *America* as *English* produce, so much that in one year 14 sail of vessels have arrived there directly from *Holland* ; and many vessels do the same to *New England* and *New York*. This is well known to every individual in those countries ; and whilst their governors are so dependent on the people, and the port officers make such immense profit by suffering it, he cannot see how it can well be prevented, but by laying some severe penalties on the transgressors, and keeping some small sloop of war with soldiers, particularly at *Rhode Island*, to protect the port officers in doing their duty. But as things now stand those officers would risk their lives in attempting it ; for there is scarce a man in all that country who is not concerned in the smuggling trade.

I have before me a particular piece written by the author of the preceding tract, on the illicit trade

trade of the colonies, particularly that of *Rhode Island*, and the means of suppressing it. Running or smuggling is there sanctified with the name of *naturalizing* foreign goods ; and in their more than hospitable and free ports, the most forbidden commodities receive the benefit of *naturalization*. But to pursue this subject would carry me too far.

To return to our correspondent's letter. He says an entire stop ought to be put (as it easily might) to the trade from *Cape Briton* to our colonies ; for from thence all sorts of *French* goods to an immense value, are yearly imported by our northern *American* vessels to every part of that continent. He likewise takes notice, by way of prevention, in case a war should break out, of a wicked practice set on foot last war in North *America*, of supplying the *French* islands with all sorts of arms, ammunition and provisions, by vessels which by management they procured to be licensed as cartels ; and with only one or two *Frenchmen* (for whom they have given as far as 40 l.) would go backwards and forwards between the *French* islands and North *America*, thus keeping on a constant trade during the whole war : so that there have been no fewer than 20 of them seen at a time in one port of *Hispaniola*. This fraudulent and pernicious practice ought to be prevented by some law made here for the purpose ; and no vessels suffered to go as cartels, with fewer than 50 or 100 prisoners : or rather they should be obliged to send all their prisoners to *England*.

Thus, Sir, I have made you up a second letter out of the remarks of two public-spirited gentlemen, zealous for the *British* glory and prosperity of the colonies, As you are one of the same  
cha-

character, and curious to enquire into the affairs of the plantations, (a disposition which is become pretty general in the nation) I send them to you, believing they will be at least as acceptable to you as those contained in my former letter.

I am, &c.

14th March

1755.

F I N I S.

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E R R A T A.

P. 9. l. 7. after *Kadaraku*, for *on r. or.*

P. 63. l. 17. for *half-penny*, *r. penny*.